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The SEC's filing of the National Student Marketing complaint was high
drama.' Charges that major law firms had participated in a fraudulent
plan predictably made the complaint a best seller. The complaint, how-
ever, could not detail the SEC's views concerning attorneys' duties under
the federal securities statutes and proper division of their loyalties be-
tween management and investors. Crucial uncertainties concerning these
questions have accumulated. At present the SEC refrains from elabora-
tion, apparently fearing accusations of improper out of court statements
on the pending case; but in due course, SEC briefs, new SEC actions, and
the decisions of the trial and appellate courts in National Student Mark-
eting will clarify the law. My thesis is that this traditional process is too
slow and piecemeal. SEC rules specifying attorneys' duties under the fed-
eral securities statutes should be drafted and promulgated as a first order
of business.
The stakes are large. Securities regulation pivots around the lawyer,
and if the SEC perceives that a significant fraction of the securities bar is
not properly discharging its duties to investors, the SEC's views should
not emerge slowly or in fragments. Ability to act quickly by rule is a
prime reason for having an SEC rather than leaving all securities regula-
tion to decentralized private damage and injunctive actions for the enforce-
ment of statutes unsupplemented by administrative rules.
The civil liabilities stakes are also immense. Lawyers have generally
conducted securities litigation against issuers, management, underwriters,
and accountants, but now they may often be among those asked to con-
tribute to injured investors' rehabilitation. The addition of lawyers has
symmetry and may remind the legal profession to take a realistic view of
the proper balancing process in determing the civil liabilities of other
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
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1 See Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
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groups. It is worthwhile, however, to prescribe and state the duties of
lawyers-hence their exposure to civil liabilities-with some thoughtful-
ness and clarity so that an optimal allocation of duties among management,
attorneys, accountants, engineers, management consultants, and underwrit-
ers will result.
In terrorem civil liabilities are overkill if they cause needless duplica-
tion among these groups. Accurate information available to all is a condi-
tion of the economist's hypothetical perfect market, but it is foolish in the
real world to require information at a cost in excess of its worth or to re-
quire excessive double-checking in a quest to eliminate all possibilities of
inaccuracy.' Although the central thrust of federal securities legislation
is toward full and accurate disclosure, the cost of producing required dis-
closures must be a part of the equation used for analyzing that which is
required of attorneys.'
I have not attempted to formulate a set of rules. The suggested rule-
making proceeding would elicit suggestions and data as a starting point.
This article is limited to a discussion of the major uncertainties concern-
ing attorneys' duties in securities work, the extent and desirability of SEC
J'rules, and directions the rules might take.
I. THE NATIONAL STUDENT MARKETING COMPLAINT
The SEC's complaint4 in National Student Marketing is a good place
to start, for the complaint concretely raises a number of the questions I
shall discuss. Its complaint is long and alleges numerous violations by mul-
tiple defendants over a substantial period of time. What follows is a
summary of the allegations against one of the law firms, White & Case.
According to the complaint, defendant National Student Marketing
Corporation (NSMC) and Interstate National Corporation (Interstate),
which had approximately 1200 shareholders, entered into an agreement
for the merger of the latter into NSMC in exchange for NSMC stock.
The closing took place on October 31, 1969; White & Case was NSMC's
counsel. Unaudited financial statements, reflecting net earnings of NSMC
of approximately $700,000 for the nine-month period ended May 31,
1969, had been included in the proxy soliciting material which was mailed
to NSMC and Interstate shareholders in seeking their approval of the merg-
2 See Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in ECONOMIC POL-
ICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SEcURITIES 1, 2-5 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
3 SEC Advisory Committee Study on Broker-Dealer Reports and Registration Requirements,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fu. SEC. L. REP. 5 79,147 (1972) proposes that more
attention be paid to cost-benefit analyses in determining the reports broker-dealers must submit.
This type of close analysis of the duties and civil liabilities of all classes of persons subject
to the federal securities statutes would itself be a worthwhile goal for an SEC rulemaking pro-
ceeding, but an administrative codification of attorneys' duties is probably the best possible first
step, for the attorney's position is pivotal but unique.
4 Complaint, supra note 1.
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er. A condition of the merger was the receipt from NSMC's accounting
firm of a comfort letter stating that they "had no reason to believe" that
the financial statements included in the soliciting material (i) were not
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and
practices or (ii) required any material adjustments for the results of
NSMC's operations to be fairly presented. In addition, the comfort letter
was to state that NSMC had not suffered any material adverse change in its
financial condition or results of operation from May 31, 1969 until five
business days prior to the effective date of the merger.
The complaint alleges that the comfort letter did not satisfy the condi-
tion in the merger agreement. The comfort letter presented at closing
(which had been dictated over the telephone and was unsigned) stated,
according to the allegations, that the accountants' examination in connec-
tion with the year ended August 31, 1969, which was still in progress, dis-
dosed three expense items (totaling $884,000) which in their opinion
should have been reflected in the nine-month financials. The SEC alleges
that as part of a "fraudulent scheme" among NSMC, several of its officers,
White & Case, Epley (a White & Case partner), several of Interstate's of-
ficers, and counsel for Interstate, the merger "was closed on October 31,
1969 without the contents of the comfort letter being disclosed to public
investors and the shareholders of NSMC or Interstate even though said
defendants knew shareholder approval of the merger had been obtained
on the basis of materially false and misleading financial statements of
NSMC for the period. ended May 31, 1969."r According to the complaint,
the accountants made subsequent amendments (apparently oral) to the
comfort letter on October 31. These amendments were progressively
more negative.
The complaint further alleges that "as part of the fraudulent scheme,"
White & Case issued its opinion letter stating "that all steps taken to con-
summate the merger had been validly taken and that NSMC had incurred
no violation of any federal or state statute or regulation to the knowledge
of counsel. Issuance of such an opinion was a condition to the merger,
as had been represented to the shareholders of NSMC and Interstate in
the proxy statements."6
In a summary paragraph the complaint alleges that as a part of the
fraudulent scheme White & Case and Epley (i) failed to refuse to issue
the opinion; and (ii) failed to insist that the financial statements be re-
vised and shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing
NSMC and, under the circumstances, to notify the SEC concerning the
misleading nature of the nine-month financial statements.1
5Id. at p. 91,913-16.
6Id.
7id. at p. 91,913-17 (epiphasis supplied).
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As a practical matter all the allegations in (ii), in connection with ac-
tions the SEC alleges were required in addition to refusing to issue the
opinion letter, are surplusage. The SEC alleged that the White & 'Case
opinion letter was a condition precedent and had been so represented in
the proxy materials. As a matter of fact, a merger agreement can author-
ize waiver of the opinion. Thus, if the crucial nature of the acquired
corporation's right to waive and its intentions at the time of the solicita-
tion regarding waiver are properly explained in the proxy materials, man-
agement could presumably waive the opinion at a closing8 (although the
potential for liability to shareholders of the acquired corporation would be
large.) Here, however, the White & Case opinion issued, apparently mark-
ing the primary basis for the SEC's complaint. If the merger had failed to
close for want of an opinion, the SEC would presumably have been satis-
fied. If the White & Case opinion properly issued, there was no duty, un-
der any theory, for White & Case to take any of the further enumerated
steps. The SEC may thus have incurred the wrath of the bar by speaking
of withdrawal from representation and notification to the SEC when these
matters need not have been mentioned. While the SEC may have been
supercautious in its pleading, the resulting diffuseness unfortunately con-
fuses two distinct issues-the legality of giving the opinion and a lawyer's
duty to notify the SEC of a client's planned violation. It is the former
issue, however, that is by far more important.
The complaint then charges that, again "as part of the fraudulent
scheme," White & Case, Epley, and an NSMC officer continued "to con-
ceal the existence of the comfort letter or the contents thereof" in connec-
tion with NSMC's 8-K reports for October and November, 1969, which
contained representations as to the fairness of the May 31, 1969, financials,
and which White & Case transmitted to the SEC.
It is alleged that because of the above-described acts, Epley and White
& Case, among others, "singly and in concert, directly and indirectly vio-
lated and aided and abetted violations of" § 17 (a) of the Securities Act,
rule lob-5, the reporting rules, and rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. The relief
requested is a permanent injunction against a wide variety of federal se-
curities acts violations. There is no SEC request for payments to investors.
At first blush, the allegations against White & Case and Epley appear
strong. Actual knowledge at closing that the May 31 financials were ma-
terially false and misleading is charged. Closing the merger and issuing
the firm's opinion are alleged to have taken place as part of a fraudulent
scheme; the same is true of the allegations about the failure to insist upon
re-solicitation, to cease representation, and to notify the SEC. As our dis-
cussion of "materiality" and Fischer v. Kletz problems will indicate, how-
8 Cf. Smalwood v. Southdown, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,435 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
9 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.DN.Y. 1967).
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ever, there are numerous factual and legal uncertainties. The SEC charges
that the alleged errors in the nine-month financials were material, but
preliminary motions in the case have already questioned whether they were
in fact material as of October 31.10 The SEC's complaint also appears to
assume that rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 require re-solicitation when a material
error in the proxy materials is discovered after the final solicitation--or
even after the shareholder vote-so long as it is before consummation of
the authorized transaction. Yet we shall see that rule 14a-9 is silent on
this precise point.1 There is, moreover, no allegation of fault or scienter
regarding the preparation of the unaudited financials or their inclusion in
the proxy materials.
The conclusory allegation of fraud masks basic issues. If White &
Case believed its opinion correct, does the SEC intend to charge that its
actions were nonetheless "part of the fraudulent scheme"? The ambiguity
arises because there is no allegation that White & Case was proceeding in
bad faith or was negligent or reckless in opining on the law or the require-
ments imposed by the merger agreement. We have only the conclusion
that the law required re-solicitation and that what was done was part of a
fraudulent scheme and thus illegal. The central and thorny issue-the de-
gree of fault or scienter necessary before an attorney's allegedly erroneous
conclusion converts him into a violator of the law-is submerged.
II. THE MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING
THE DUTIES OF SECURITIES LAWYERS
In summary, the current uncertainties about securities lawyers' duties
can be grouped into three categories:
1. Those of the type glossed over in the National Student Marketing
complaint concerning when an attorney's allegedly erroneous conclusion
that the securities laws have been satisfied convert him into a violator of
those laws.
2. Those concerning the responsibility of counsel for the accuracy
and completeness of facts in a disclosure document drafted or passed on by
him and of facts presented to him as the basis for his favorable opinion on
an exemption from some requirement (usually registration of securities) of
the securities statutes.
3. Those concerning whether counsel for a corporation or other entity
also automatically has as his clients the investors and prospective investors
in the entity so that his duties in performing securities work for the entity
run to the investors and prospective investors as well as the entity.
The securities statutes and the SEC's rules specify little about the law-
yer's role and duties. The Securities Act requires inclusion in the registra-
tion statement of an opinion of counsel concerning the "legality" of reg-
10 See REvinw oF SECURrIEs REGULATION 913-16 (June 7, 1972).
11 See text accompanying notes 109-11 infra.
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istered securities being sold. 2 The SEC's forms expand this to include
due authorization, fully paid and assessability status, and the enforceabil-
ity of debt securities in accordance with their terms."3 In fact, it is often
required that lawyers' opinions on matters such as patents and tax treat-
ment be filed with the registration statement. In giving these limited opin-
ions, the attorney files a formal consent to use and probably has, under
§ 11 of the Securities Act,14 duties as an "expert" to all purchasers
(whether or not in privity with the attorney) to exercise reasonable care in
investigating the facts on which his opinion is based and in applying the
law to them.15  In general, however, there are no explicit governmentally
imposed standards for lawyers' preparation of disclosure documents or
concerning lawyers' opinions not mentioned in disclosure documents. Es-
cott v. BarChris Construction Corp.16 confirmed that issuer's and under-
writers' counsel are not "experts" under § 11 of the Securities Act simply
because they have drafted the registration statement. The lawyers held
liable in BarChris were so held because of their positions as directors, al-
though the court noted that the dual status increased their duties of rea-
sonable investigation as directors.' 7
Insofar as § 11 is concerned, a lawyer, who drafts all of the narrative
portion of a registration statement and whose opinion on the "legality"
of the registered securities being sold is correct, can walk away from lia-
bility for disclosure and other defects in the remainder of the registration
statement even if he was negligent or reckless in constructing the statement.
This result seems odd when contrasted with § 11's explicit duties of rea-
sonable investigation required of, inter alia, directors, underwriters, and
accountants and an almost absolute liability for material defects upon the
issuer. But the very explicitness of § 11 concerning these other persons
12 Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A (29), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (29) (1970). [Hereinafter
the Securities Act of 1933 will be referred to as the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 will be referred to as the Exchange Act.)
'1 See, e.g., SEC Form S-1, Instructions as to Exhibits, Item 6, 1 CCH Fm). SEC. L. REp. 5
7123.
14Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
15 Liability under § 11 as an "expert" in no event attaches unless the attorney consents to
being named as having prepared or certified a part of the registration statement. Securities Act,
§§ 11(a) (4), 11(b) (3) (B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a) (4),77k(b) (3) (B) (1970). The written
consent must be filed with the registration statement. Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970).
The Commission's rules on consents are SEC Rules 435-37, 17 C.F.R. § 230.435-.437 (d972).
In WHEN CORPORATIONS GO PUBLIC 127-28 (C. Israels & G. Duff, Jr., eds. 1962) [here-
inafter referred to as WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC), it is noted that some counsel consent
to use of their opinions but "add at the end of those opinions that by giving this consent they
do not admit that they are experts within the meaning of § 11 . Id. Specimen texts in
prospectuses concerning experts are found in id. at 250-51.
The current and prospective financial interests of counsel in the issuer will usually have to
be disclosed in the prospectus. SEC, Guide for Preparation and Filing of Registration State-
ments, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 3816.
1 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
17 Id. at 686-87, 689-92.
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seems to support the implicit conclusion of BarChris that attorneys, qua
attorneys, are covered by § 11 only to the extent that they give opinions
which they file in the registration statement and with respect to which they
file the formal consent to use. The conclusion in BarChris (which is im-
plicit) on this point is not askew, because to the degree that a registration
statement is "expertised" by the attorney, the § 11 duties of the other par-
ticipants in the offering diminish sharply. In fact, just that argument was
made in BarChris by participants other than the attorneys, but Judge Mc-
Lean rejected it for the reason just stated.
The general antifraud rules, now the heart of federal securities regula-
tion, are the primary governors of attorneys' duties under the federal se-
curities statutes. Attorneys are the draftsmen of securities and disclosure
documents, and they, by definition, know the most about the demands of
securities regulation. They are also the key men in negotiation processes,
and the issuer's counsel usually has had a deep, continuing involvement
in the issuer's affairs, thus accumulating considerable information about
them. The antifraud rules cut through the privity citadel: rule 10b-5,
the antifraud provision of greatest applicability to attorneys' conduct in
securities work, proscribes fraud and material misstatements of facts and
half-truths of facts by any person in connection with any transaction in
any security. Attorneys' securities advice and opinions are thus within
the reach of rule 10b-5, although attorneys are seldom actual purchasers
or sellers.
For example, one who is neither a purchaser nor a seller of a security
can be liable to a person who is a purchaser or seller, if the former's fraud,
material misstatement or half-truth damaged the seller or purchaser in his
securities transaction. Rule 10b-5 applies whether or not the purchase or
sale is in the trading markets and whether or not the transaction is covered
by § 11 of the Securities Act. Consider then an issuer's counsel, knowing
of material defects in a prospectus, but nevertheless opining to an under-
writer (in an-opinion which, as we shall see, is not a part of the registra-
tion statement) that he "knows of no violation of the federal securities
laws" in connection with the transaction. The attorney has knowingly
made a material misstatement in connection with the sale of a security.
Though I know of no case exactly in point, it is clear that although a pub-
lic purchaser from the underwriter could not collect damages from the at-
torney under § 11, the purchaser could usually reach the attorney under
rule lob-5.,' 8 Causation is easily proven as we shall see, because no major
securities transaction will close in the absence of a comprehensive, favor-
able opinion from issuer's counsel delivered to the immediate purchaser
(the underwriter in this case).
s Cf. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Simon, 425
F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
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But what is the role of rule 10b-5 if the attorney is only negligent in
giving an incorrect opinion to a purchaser? These and other questions
about the reach of the antifraud rules are best deferred until an examina-
tion of attorneys' duties under ordinary state law principles of contract and
tort law to clients and addressees of opinions. As we have already seen,
much of the attorney's advice-giving and opinion work never shows up
in registration statements and other formal disclosure documents delivered
to the public. The world of securities, however, revolves around the law-
yer's blessings delivered to direct purchasers (which in a public offering
are usually the underwriters) in the form of opinion letters. The extent
to which counsel is liable under state law to persons in privity with him
for substandard advice or opinions concerning matters regulated by the
federal securities statutes may not be sufficiently appreciated. Considera-
tion of these duties will introduce us to the lawyer's role in securities trans-
actions and help to focus the issues under the federal antifraud provisions.
Starting the discussion with state law duties has its disadvantages. What
is initially considered is often an amalgam of liabilities under the federal
securities statutes and under state law-more specifically, the situation in
which the client or addressee is liable to ultimate purchasers under the
federal securities statutes and attempts to recover, on a state law negli-
gence theory, from its counsel for substandard investigation, advice or
opinions concerning the federal standards. Mixed questions of federal
and state law repeatedly present themselves. Just as corporation law and
securities regulation have become inextricably intertwined, state law negli-
gence considerations applicable to attorneys' corporate and securities work
cannot be separated from the bodies of substantive law governing that
work. But examination of all seamless webs must start somewhere, and I
am convinced that examination of uncertainties under state law provides
the best initial illumination.
Treatment of uncertainties under state law can be only an informed
speculation. Indeed, the paucity of malpractice recoveries for errors of
judgment and the almost total absence of cases concerning substandard se-
curities work have led one student commentator on the National Student
Marketing complaint to conclude that there is little danger to securities
lawyers lurking in state malpractice law.19 Yet some first-rate articles are
beginning to appear on these questions, 0 indicating a developing belief
(which I believe to be correct) that securities lawyers are foolish if they
19 Note, Securities Regulation-Attorneys' Liability-Advising, Abetting, and the SEC's Na-
tional Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TExAS L. REV. 1265, 1271-72 (1972).
2
o See, e.g., Cheek, Counsel Names in a Prospectus, REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
939-46 (April 5, 1973); Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Tran. .- An Attempt to Bring
Some Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAw. 915 (197 3. athrop Rinehart, Legal Mal-
Practice and Rule 10b-5 Liability: Pitfalls for the Occasional Lecurities P'ractitioner, 5 LOYOLA
L. REV-L. A. 449 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Lathr a.-Rine'hart].
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believe they are above or beyond the practical reach of state malpractice
law.
A. Uncertainties Under State Law
1. The Scope of the Lawyer's Engagement and His Opinion
In a major securities transaction outside the trading markets, the direct
purchasers (which in a public offering are usually the underwriters) com-
monly require a comprehensive, formal, written opinion addressed to them
from both their counsel and the issuer's counsel.21 The opinions go well
beyond what the securities law would require. Indeed, in an unregistered
offering there is no securities law requirement for a legal opinion, and in a
registered offering the opinions required by the Securities Act to be in-
cluded in the registration statement are limited in scope.22 Purchasers in
major transactions, however, insist upon the opinion of their counsel and
issuer's counsel on numerous legal points about the securities, and the
issuer's business, assets, and liabilities.2 3 These opinion letters are not in-
cluded or required to be included in the registration statement in a public
offering. The opinions include matters which would be included in the
absence of securities regulation (for example, the legal attributes of se-
curities being purchased and due organization and existence of the issuer)
in opinion language that seems to obligate counsel under state contract
and tort law to make non-negligent determinations of the facts on which
the legal conclusions are based as well as of the legal conclusions them-
selves.
A form of opinion that seems clearly to obligate counsel to use reason-
able care in determining the facts on which his legal conclusion is based
is one specifying counsel's close relationship to the issuer (perhaps he has
been general counsel), enumerating some of the documents examined, and
stating that counsel has also examined such corporate records as deemed
necessary for the opinion. This type of explicit preamble is not uncom-
mon,2 4 but as it is watered down or made less explicit, there may be nice
questions as to counsel's undertaking with respect to the factual basis for
an opinion. We shall see that on certain matters, counsel's opinion will
attempt express limitations upon fact-vouching or upon a duty of factual
investigation. Sophisticated purchasers will of course try to obligate coun-
sel to give an opinion covering the factual base. For example, an opinion
2 1 For a form of opinion of issuer's counsel, see WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC,
supra note 15, at 312-16. The matters on which issuer's and purchaser's counsel will opine
are usually specified in the purchase or underwriting agreement.
2 2 See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text for opinions required by the Securities Act.
23 See the form of opinion in WHEN CORPORATONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, at 312-16.
24 See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLI, supra note 15, at 312-13, for an example of such
a preamble.
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on the nonassessability of stock is worth little if counsel could exclude a
study of the charter. For now the discussion will be restricted to opinions
requiring a reasonable investigation of the factual base.
Consider issuer's and purchaser's counsel opining, to a person who
purchases from the corporation in an unregistered private offering, that the
stock is non-assessable while the charter (which because of neglect is not
checked by either counsel) states that the stock is assessable and local law
renders it assessable in that limited circumstance. This would be about as
clear a case of negligence (failing to check the charter) as one could
imagine, and if the purchaser is forced to pay an assessment, one cause of
action is the straightforward one against both counsel under state law for
negligence. Other possibilities abound. Perhaps the purchaser can re-
scind under state law, rule lOb-5, or § 12(2) -of the Securities Act. The
attorneys' negligent statement in their opinion letters may render them
liable to the purchaser in damages under rule lOb-5. But the actions un-
der rule 10b-5 or § 12 against the attorneys may be difficult.25  The pur-
chaser's best action against the attorney is probably the simple one under
state law.
It is this cause of action-the straightforward one under state law for
negligence-which I am discussing in this portion of the article; and in-
deed, the lawyer's exposure may be greatest under this theory." I am al-
25 First, is an erroneous opinion a misstatement of fact? It clearly is if the opinion giver
does not believe the opinion correct, for his state of mind is misrepresented. But to convert
an erroneous opinion given in good faith (but after negligent research) into a misstatement
of fact requires that the theory of implied representation be mobilized. An opinion is not a
warranty or a fiat statement that the opined matter is true. In the securities field the theory
of implied representation is widely used to impose desired duties upon professionals connected
with the sale and trading of securities. Perhaps an attorney giving a securities opinion im-
pliedly represents to the recipient that reasonable care has been used in preparing the opinion
and a failure to use reasonable care is thus a misrepresentation of a material fact. Even if, how-
ever, an implied representation concept is applicable, the type of care impliedly represented is
not self-evident. Especially in the Second Circuit there is still considerable talk about required
culpability beyond ordinary negligence before a material misstatement of fact violates rule
10b-5. See Lathrop & Rinehart, supra note 20, at 470-75. For a comprehensive discussion of
scienter and fault standards, see Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 5 93,816 (2d Cir. 1973).
Section 12(2) reaches material misstatements resulting from ordinary negligence, but the
section applies only to one who "sells" securities and it may be doubtful whether the attorneys
"sold" within the meaning of that section. See text accompanying notes 121-28 infra.
Furthermore, § 12(2) probably would not allow damages in an amount greater than the
purchase price. This would seem to follow from the limitation to "the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon .... upon the tender of such security, or for damages if [the
purchaser] no longer owns the security." Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
In the hypothetical posed in the text, the application of this limitation is not so clear, for the as-
sessments themselves could conceivably be deemed consideration paid for the security.
26 The best works pointed toward the securities lawyer are Lathrop & Rinehart, supra note
20; Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW 1153 (1972) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Karmel]; Freeman, Liability of Counsel for Issuer, and Henkel, The Liability of
Counsel for Underwriter, in The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 523, at 635,
641 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Freeman and as Henkel, respectively].
For an excellent general coverage of malpractice, see Comment, Professional Negligence,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 627 (1973); Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292
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so placing to one side for a moment the question of an attorney's liability
to persons who are not clients or addressees of opinions.27  As we shall
see, at least the issuing corporation's counsel may soon be considered coun-
sel for the entity and its shareholders and prospective shareholders, thus
placing him in privity with everyone who may be injured by his negli-
gence or culpability in his securities work.28 But that is a separate chapter;
this section is limited to clients and addressees of opinions.
The Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits attempted limitation
of liability to the client for the attorney's personal malpractice,29 which
could include the liabilities of issuer's counsel to purchasers. The very
purpose of having the opinion of issuer's counsel addressed to the purchas-
ers is to cut the privity knot. Commonly, the purchasers also have their
own counsel, and in negotiation of terms I doubt that many persons would
think that issuer's counsel is representing anyone other than the issuer. On
the matters covered by the opinion, however, the relationship between is-
suer's counsel and the purchasers may be one of attorney and client.30
The opinions issued to purchasers in major securities transactions also
cover, to a limited extent, compliance with securities statutes and regula-
tion. A customary opinion to underwriters is that the form of the
disclosure documents (excluding financials, about which attorneys seldom
consciously31 opine) comply in all material respects with the statutes and
the SEC's rules; this matter, as well as the others we have discussed, is
covered in normal opinion language that obligates counsel to make non-
negligent determinations of the facts on which the legal conclusions are
based as well as of the legal conclusions themselves. 32  Attorneys do not
appreciate the degree to which (I believe) the unqualified opinion on
"form" may obligate them as to facts. The "qualify in form" language
clearly does not go to the absence of material misstatements or half-
truths, but it may force an attorney to investigate facts to determine if there
is coverage in form of all items required by the SEC's rules to be stated.
If there is no (or limited) discussion in a prospectus of an item specifically
required to be disclosed, doesn't the attorney's unqualified opinion that the
(1963). In fact, there is relatively little case law or empirical data on attorney malpractice.
Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, YALE L. J. 590 (1973).
27 Since California usually pioneers in expanding tort remedies, Lathrop & Rinehart, supra
note 20, is strong on this point. Freeman and Henkel, supra note 26, discuss the issue from more
traditional vantage points.
2 8 See text accompanying notes 83-99 infra.
29 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY, DISCIPLINARY RULES 6-101, 6-102.
30 If the fact that the opinion is addressed to the purchaser is not enough to create an at-
torney-client relationship with respect to matters covered by the opinion, the case law on the
duties of corporate counsel to prospective shareholders may create the relationship. See text
accompanying notes 83-99 infra.
31 Attorneys may unconsciously opine on some financial data, if the data is presented or re-
quired to be presented outside the certified financials. See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
3 2 See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, 5 (10), at 315-16.
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registration statement and prospectus comply in form require him to investi-
gate the facts at least sufficiently to indicate that the absence of discussion
or limited discussion seems justified?
Consider a simpler case: Issuer's counsel, underwriter's counsel, and the
underwriter all know of certain information omitted from the registration
statement. The underwriter asks both counsel whether the SEC's rules re-
quire inclusion. Both say no and their opinion letters state that in their
opinion the registration statement complies in form in all material respects.
Suppose the attorneys are wrong; the applicable SEC form clearly required
inclusion, and the SEC's forms are part of its rules."3 Assume further that
the omission is material. Under § 11, if there is a material omission, it
matters not whether the omission is in the prospectus or in the other docu-
ments required to be filed as part of the registration statement. 4 If the un-
derwriter is held liable, under § 11(a), to public purchasers (a nice ques-
tion in light of its reliance upon counsel',), the underwriter cannot sue the
attorneys under § 11. The underwriter, however, was in privity with both
counsel; both addressed their opinions to the underwriter. Under state
law, the underwriter should have a near-perfect negligence action against
both counsel.
The question is not entirely one of state law, however. The Globus
litigation 6 established that an underwriter liable to a public purchaser for
a material misstatement in a prospectus cannot enforce an indemnifica-
tion agreement against the issuer if the underwriter knows of the material
misstatement. This result obtains as a matter of federal law, although an
indemnification right, as opposed to a right to contribution," for liabil-
ities under the federal securities statutes appears to exist only if a contrac-
tual right under state law has been created. Globus held that the federal
securities statutes would be frustrated if an underwriter with knowledge of
a material misstatement could enforce a contractual indemnification right,
3 3 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.0-1(a) (1972).
34 Securities Act § 11 cases seem invariably to involve alleged defects in the prospectus, but
§ 11 explicitly refers to defects in the registration statement (of which the prospectus is only
a part).
3 5 As I read Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 692-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), the failures of an underwriters' counsel in investigating facts are the underwriters' fail-
ures. The opinion, however, seems to indicate that a different case might be presented when an
underwriter relies upon counsel's legal advice. Id. at 697. But should an underwriter be allowed,
for § 11 purposes, to rely almost conclusively upon counsel's legal advice when that advice is
not a part of the registration statement and not given by counsel as a § 11 expert?
36 Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Services, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 Gt970);
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Services, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d .Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). See Note, Globus: A Prolific
Generator of Nice Questions, 33 OMo ST. UJ. 898 (1972).
37 Securities Act § 11 (f) itself creates a specified right to contribution in respect of § 11
liabilities. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970). On the emerging general federal law concerning con-
tribution and indemnity among joint tort-feasors violating a federal statute, see Note, supra note
36.
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for the underwriter would have less incentive to force issuers to issue truth-
ful and complete prospectuses.3 8  The last Globus case3" held that the Se-
curities Act itself would allow contribution among several participants if
all of them had knowledge of the disclosure defect.
Where does Globus leave our hypothetical underwriter, which knew of
the omitted facts, but which had been assured by both counsel that omis-
sion was proper under the SEC's rules? Does Globus indicate that the
Securities Act precludes assertion of the state law negligence claim against
the attorneys because it would be tantamount to an indemnification and
the underwriter had knowledge? I think not. Our underwriter was act-
ing in good faith and its reliance upon counsel, if not satisfying the due
diligence standard of § 11,40 was not unreasonable. No Securities Act pol-
icy would be frustrated by the underwriter's recovery against the attorneys.
The Globus case demonstrates, however, that state law remedies
against attorneys cannot be considered wholly apart from the federal se-
curities statutes. If the client or addressee of the opinion knows that the
attorney's advice is wrong or suspect, there may be insufficient reliance
upon the opinion to support 'recovery under a state law negligence theory.
To a large extent, the limitations in Globus simply parallel that principle,
but I am not sure that there is congruence.
When the issuer is held liable under the federal securities statutes for
a defective disclosure document or failure to register securities and at-
tempts to recover from its attorney for his negligence in preparing the
document or erroneously advising that an exemption was available, the
Globus issue becomes even more interesting. If the issuer was held liable
under § 11 or § 12(1) of the Securities Act, the liability was imposed un-
der provisions that create near-absolute issuer liability. Is an attempted
-shift of the liability to the attorney under a state law negligence theory
a forbidden attempt to secure indemnification? Again the issuer's culpa-
bility is important. If it knew or suspected that the disclosure document
was incomplete or that the exemption was unavailable, the state law action
should stumble on the causation element, mooting the Globus question.
If, however, the issuer was pure, should the action over under state law
nevertheless be precluded as contrary to the policies of the federal secur-
ities statutes? On the other hand, wouldn't a stifling of claims against at-
torneys in this situation diminish attorneys' incentives for careful work and
advice?
Usually, purchasers also insist upon as much assurance as possible from
attorneys that the facts stated in disclosure documents, for example, a pro-
38 Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Services, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
39 Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Services, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd per
curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
40 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
spectus (or an offering circular or letter in an unregistered offering), con-
tain no material misstatement or half-truth. Attorneys have always taken
the position, so far successfully, that they will not give a normal opinion
(that in their opinion the documents contain no material omission or half-
truth)-1 Such an opinion would place lawyers in much the same position
vis-a-vis the whole disclosure document as accountants occupy vis-a-vis
certified financials, for the lawyers would be obligated to conduct a rea-
sonable investigation of all the issuer's business, affairs, assets, and liabil-
ities. Such a far-ranging duty of investigation has been rejected by law-
yers. Rather, lawyers will state in their opinions to purchasers only that
they know of no material misstatement or half-truth, 42 and the financials
are often excluded from even this negative assurance ("comfort") lan-
guage.43  An alternative formulation, obviously more expansive, is to rep-
resent that counsel "knows" of no violation. of the securities laws. 44 Let us
assume, for the time being at least, that these forms of limited negative as-
surance on facts are not inconsistent with the federal securities statutes. 45
From the form of the opinion, one might think that lawyers have lim-
ited the scope of their engagement and thus worded their way out of any
possible liability based upon either a claim by a client or an addressee
of an opinion or a failure to perform agreed-upon or otherwise required
investigation of the accuracy of the disclosure documents. In fact, how-
ever, ambiguities abound, and I believe the exposure of corporate counsel
to the corporation and purchasers, and of purchasers' counsel on this point
to his clients, may be much greater than has been assumed. Both counsel
inevitably perform some factual investigation,46 and it is usually unclear
how much investigation counsel has agreed to perform. The opinions that
do not directly bear upon securities regulation will require some factual
verification. Counsel (especially the issuer's counsel) are usually the field
captains in a securities transaction, and disclosure documents are given their
final form by counsel. Most importantly, issuers and many purchasers ex-
pect their respective counsel to undertake considerable, but unspecified,
investigation. It would not surprise me to learn that a majority of issuers
consciously or unconsciously look to their counsel to ensure that counsel
41 See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, 5 (10) at 315-16; Dean, The
Lawyer's Problems in the Registration of Securities, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 154, 181-82
(1937) [hereinafter referred to as Dean].
42 The formulation in WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, at 312-16, is more
demanding. In the pertinent provision of the opinion (paragraph (10)), the attorneys opine
that they "have no reason to believe" there is a material misstatement or half-truth.
43 See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, 5 (10) at 315-16.
44 According to the SEC's allegations in the Complaint, supra note 1, this was the form of
the opinion of issuer's counsel. See notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text.
45 Concerning duties of factual investigation imposed upon counsel by the federal securities
statutes, see Part II (E) of this article, infra.
4 6 See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, at 121-28, 157; Henkel, supra
note 26, at 641.
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and company personnel together undertake a reasonable investigation of
all facts necessary to be disclosed.
I believe that most issuer's counsel would disagree with this statement
of their charge and would point to the wording of the opinion to the pur-
chaser as evidence of a much lesser charge. If the issuer's counsel on a
securities matter is the corporation's general counsel, the most formal rec-
ord of counsel's intended role may be his statement (bill) rendered after
the transaction. The statement will always reflect considerable factual in-
vestigation. Though the most comprehensive opinion rendered by issuer's
counsel will be to the underwriter, counsel is working for the issuer, whose
general expectations are communicated-giving an optimal blend of: (i)
speed in drafting papers and disclosure documents, qualifying the issue for
sale, and closing the sale; and (ii) protection from liability. Refined
questions such as the allocation of responsibility for factual accuracy and
completeness between counsel and company personnel are often left un-
settled or never explicitly raised. The potential for arguable attorney lia-
bility to the issuer if the issuer is found liable for defective disclosure
documents and cross-claims against the attorney under a state law negli-
gence theory is obvious.
There is a similar possibility of misunderstanding between the pur-
chaser and its counsel concerning counsel's role in factual investigation,
but the probability is less since the purchaser's counsel is a stranger to the
issuer and historically has investigated less than issuer's counsel.
These ambiguities concerning counsel's role in factual investigation
would, one might think, long ago have caused lawyers to work on securi-
ties sales only pursuant to a detailed engagement letter specifying what
counsel would and would not do, for the form of the opinion letters (no
knowledge of material misstatements or half-truths) should not be trusted
to carry the day if strong contrary evidence of expected factual investiga-
tion exists. Counsel have, however, badly represented themselves, as such
engagement letters have been rare. In an analogous situation, the prepara-
tion of unaudited statements, the decision in 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max
Rothenburg & Co.48 has made accountants aware of the value of detailed
engagement letters in combating malpractice actions.49
There is, furthermore, an ambiguity in the phrasing of counsel's opin-
ion on the antifraud question-that counsel does not know of a material
misstatement or half-truth-because "know" or "knowledge" is not de-
fined. The term presumably means actual knowledge. Since, however,
47 This is only my personal impression.
48 36 App. Div. 2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971), aff'd without opinion, 30 N.Y.2d 585,
281 N.E.2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972). See Note, Certified Public Accountants' Liability
for Unaudited Financial Statements, 8 CALIF. WEST. L. REv. 368 (1972).
49 Much of the December, 1972, issue of the Journal of Accountancy is devoted to engage-
ment letters and unaudited statements.
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counsel performs some factual investigation, an alternate meaning, that
from all of the facts known to him he has reason to know, is surely pos-
sible 0  ,
Other uncertainties about counsel's engagement arise because of abbre-
viated descriptions in prospectuses of counsel's role. Though apparently
not required by the Securities Act or the SEC's rules, customarily included
in a prospectus is a caption listing counsel for the issuer and the under-
writers' counsel and briefly mentioning what they have done. The form of
description of counsel's work varies. Sometimes it is stated that counsel
has passed upon the "legality" of the issue or that counsel has passed up-
on Securities Act matters;51 both formulae are inexplicit. One who has not
seen the actual opinions might think that "legality" would necessarily
comprehend full compliance with the Securities Act. And an attorney
who writes a prospectus stating that he has "passed upon" Securities Act
matters ought to realize that a not unnatural interpretation by persons hav-
ing no access to the opinions would be that counsel's opinion covers the
factual accuracy of the prospectus.
Though these formulae have been used in prospectuses for so long that
they are probably immune from attack as materially misleading, it would
be preferable to specify the limited scope of the matters that counsel have
passed upon. The most sophisticated public purchasers know the limits
of counsel's opinion, but a moderately sophisticated public purchaser might
believe that one or both counsel have passed upon the, factual accuracy
of the prospectus. The point may be material, and it would be unfortu-
nate if the portion of the prospectus describing the functions of counsel
were found materially misleading; the attorney's liability under state law
over to the issuer and the underwriters after the latter have paid under
§ 11 would seem relatively automatic. Moreover, a failure in the prospec-
tus to describe the limited scope of counsel's work aggravates counsel's
problems in persuading clients that counsel's responsibility for factual ac-
curacy and completeness is as limited as his opinion indicates.
A current uncertainty revolves around the use of the term "General
Counsel" in public reports and documents to describe the corporation's re-
lationship with its outside law firm. In Black & Company v. Nova-Tech,
50 In the opinion letter reprinted in WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15 5
(10) at 315-16, the pertinent portion words this opinion in terms of counsel's "having no rea-
son" to believe there is a material misstatement or half truth. This formulation seems to include
a deficiency of which counsel has reason to know, based upon facts known to him.
For discussion of this inquiry notice issue as it arises in the context of the antifraud rules, see
Part II(E) of this article infra.
5 1 WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, supra note 15, at 250-51 gives a specimen text of
the discussion in a prospectus of counsel's status as an expert with reference to title to an im-
portant piece of real estate.
Concerning use of counsel's name in a prospectus, see Cheek, supra note 20. See also Fuld,
supra note 20.
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Inc.,52 the issue was whether California counsel were amenable to service
of process in Oregon with respect to an allegation that the client's sales of
unregistered securities in Oregon violated that state's securities laws. The
court stated that the law firm's designation in the client's published re-
ports as the client's corporate counsel was enough for purposes of the
Oregon Securities Law "to make the firm's partners 'participants' in any un-
lawful securities transaction in which the annual reports were used for pro-
motional purposes." This is surely hyperbole, even under the sweeping
Oregon authority relied upon by the court, but designations such as cor-
porate counsel or General Counsel do imply a continuing, deep involve-
ment in the client's affairs.
2. The Duty to Reveal Doubts
Yet another uncertainty arises from securities lawyers' practice of af-
firmatively opining in unqualified language without mentioning or evalu-
ating substantial possibilities of a different answer. For example, if the sale
is made in reliance upon an exemption from registration (such as the pri-
vate offering exemption), cautious issuers and participating broker-deal-
ers will require written opinions of counsel concerning the availability of
the exemption. Counsel's favorable legal conclusion on a dose question
will usually be as unqualified as if there were an overpowering case for
the exemption (say, the sole proprietor of the corner adult book store in-
corporates as the only shareholder). In response to the demands of pur-
chasers and clients, the practice of securities lawyers in giving written opin-
ions-especially to purchasers-is usually to banish doubt. Though it of-
ten would be truthful to say that, for example, there is an estimated 60-40
probability of success in litigation, this form of opinion is almost never is-
sued to a purchaser, but counsel for the issuer may come close to telling
the issuer that this is the fact. Either the opinion issues "dean" or it never
emerges; this is so even with respect to the private offering exemption,
whose legal definition is almost-formless. In prospectuses, if counsel con-
sents to description of, say, his tax opinion (which, by such consent, will
probably subject the attorney to the duties of an "expert" under § 11 of
the Securities Act), substantial uncertainties will be flagged. Furthermore,
blue sky opinions to underwriters commonly state the uncertainties.54 The
bar apparently assumes, however, that when they deal with a puzzle in
other contexts, their "clean" opinions represent only that the indicated re-
sult is more likely than not and that substantial uncertainties or authori-
52 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971).
53 333 F. Supp. at 472.54 See the various blue sky memoranda set out in L. Loss & B. CoWETT, BLUE SKY LAW96-122 (1958). One memorandum states, "Accordingly the information furnished herein mustbe regarded as a practical guide rather than an opinion from us with respect to the laws of thejurisdictions concerned." Id. at 96.
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ties looking in the opposite direction need not be disclosed in their opin-
ion. While the recipients of such opinions are usually sophisticates who
probably understand this convention, a laconic favorable opinion on a
puzzle may not be the best starting point if the recipient of the opinion
relies upon it, is found liable under the securities statutes, and charges
that attorney with malpractice on the theory that had the recipient known
of the considerable uncertainty he would have chosen a safer alternative 5
3. Divison of Labor and Overlapping
Most of these uncertainties are of attorneys' own making and they can
remove them through the type of detailed, cautious approach now recom-
mended for accountants in engagement and comfort letters. 6 Inexplicit-
ness in these areas is not, however, solely lawyers' private concern. For
example, in an underwriting covered by the Securities Act, an explicit di-
vision of labor between counsel and others is in the public interest as well
as the lawyer's private interest. Since at least the managing underwriter
must make a reasonably comprehensive investigation and since the issuer
is an absolute insurer, what the attorney expressly excludes from the scope
of his investigational responsibilities should and will likely be covered by
others. A misunderstanding on allocation of responsibilities, on the other
hand, can lead the best-intentioned team to miss important areas.
Another danger for attorneys is that their attempted exclusion of the
financials from their opinions is probably ineffectual, for a sharp division
between the financials and narrative disclosures no longer exists. Gamble-
Skogmo57 established that where certified financials may properly exclude,
or be required to exclude, figures not compatible with generally accepted
accounting principles (for instance, because the figures are not based upon
historical costs), the disclosure document in which the financials are used
can violate the antifraud rules for failure to include in the narrative por-
tion the excluded figures and their significance if they are material to the
transaction. 58 Under this formulation, the attorney must ensure that the
narrative portion properly describes such figures excluded from the finan-
cials and their significance and that to his knowledge the description con-
tains no material inaccuracies or omission. His opinion at dosing, that he
knows of no material misstatement or half-truth in the narrative portion,
and his duties to his client (clients?) require as much. Even if his opin-
55 See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra.
5 6 See note 48 supra and accompanying text; AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING PROCE-
DURE No. 48, LETTERS FOR UNDERWRITERS (1971). See also Cheek, supra note 20; Fuld, supra
note 20.
57 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
5 8 See 298 F. Supp. at 91 n.6, 92, 101; accord, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). For an excellent article on "soft" figures and other "soft"
information, see Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 254 (1972).
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ion excludes the financials he is not aided, for the defect would appear in
the narrative portion.
United States v. Simon59 establishes related propositions: (1) that ac-
tual absence of a good faith belief that certified financials make a fair pre-
sentation can constitute criminal scienter by the certifying accountant; and
(2) fair presentation is not always established by adherance to generally
accepted accounting principles: a common sense gloss must be applied for
crucial, unusual items of which the accountant has knowledge. The Si-
mon approach differs somewhat from Gamble-Skogmo in that Simon indi-
cates that the accountant must sometimes cause the financials to be supple-
mented with information not required by generally accepted accounting
principles before he issues his favorable opinion, but the two approaches
are not inconsistent. In Gamble-Skogmo and other cases of its kind, the
accountants were not the plaintiff's target, whereas Simon was a criminal
prosecution against the accountant. The cases establish an overlapping
responsibility between accountants and others to ensure that figures pre-
sented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles do not
create a material half-truth. The overlap expands the attorney's duties as
more and more data in the financials must be supplemented in the nar-
rative portion of disclosure documents. 6
B. Uncertainties Caused by Expanding Materiality Concepts
Another major uncertainty about counsel's opinion that he knows of no
material omission or half-truth results from the significant, recent expan-
sion of the "materiality" concept. Counsel knows many facts not stated in
the disclosure documents and numerous elaborations and qualifications
that might be added to the facts presented in them. The federal securities
statutes, however, contemplate readable and comprehensible summaries
59425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
60 In some opinion letters, it will be a nice question of interpretation whether the exclusion
of financials from counsel's opinion is broad enough also to exclude figures required to be dis-
closed in the narrative portion of the statement (or required to be disclosed there if not dis-
closed in the financials themselves).
In the pertinent provision of the opinion letter in WHEN CoRPoRATIoNs Go PUBLIC, supra
note 15, 5 (10), at 315-16, there is excepted from the opinions on "compliance as to form"
and absence of material half-truths and misstatements, "the financial statements schedules and
other financial data" included in the prospectus. I doubt that this is much protection. An
appraisal, engineer's report, or geologist's report would seem not excluded. The "surplus sur-
plus" of the acquired company in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), is a closer question, though a narrative explanation seems to have been
what the court contemplated, and a narrative explanation with a few figures included is prob-
ably not "financial data." Likewise if a company must disclose dismal operating and financial
projections for the forthcoming year or so, a narrative form would predominate, and surely
material describing the business, capitalization, and conflict of interest transactions is not "fi-
nancial data."
An even more basic question is whether the language quoted in the immediately preceding
paragraph excludes narrative material (primarily footnotes) in the certified financials and other
primarily financial schedules.
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rather than catalogs stuffed with detail. 1 Proper exclusion, cutting and
trimming is a major step in producing a good disclosure document that is
both readable and comprehensible. With the materiality test rapidly los-
ing its content, however, the attorney's judgment that items can be omitted
as immaterial becomes an increasingly dangerous exercise. In malpractice
actions, a good faith, informed judgment regarding an unsettled body of
law creates no liability, whether or not the courts ultimately agree with the
lawyer's opinion." But counsel could conceivably be liable to his clients
for damages resulting from his choice of a riskier method or proceeding as
opposed to a proven, safe alternative. 63  Should counsel, therefore, be ul-
tracautious in omitting information, especially since he is opining that
there are no material omissions or misstatements? This question can no
longer be taken lightly. Though it will carry us somewhat afield, it is
worthwhile at this point to examine what has happened to the materiality
test in recent decisions.
The concept of what constitutes a material fact determines, perhaps
more than any other test, the demands of the federal securities statutes and
one's exposure for disclosure defects. In every press release, report, pro-
spectus and proxy statement there can be found omissions, misstatements
and half-truths, no matter how careful the preparers are. Describing the
history, health, results of operations and prospects of anything so compli-
cated as a business and its interactions with the world is difficult (especially
in a summary document) and is a process done differently by equally qual-
ified persons. One lawyer or accountant can always look at the work of
another and find omissions, misstatements and half-truths. The material
fact limitations in various requirements of the securities laws should limit
redress to instances of omissions or misstatements about essentials, which
are of necessity rather limited in number.64  The material fact limitations
should also provide the direction and protection necessary for the prepar-
61 See, e.g., SEC Form S-1, General Instruction D (a), 1 CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 7122:
The purpose of the prospectus is to inform investors. Hence, the information set
forth in the prospectus should be presented in clear, concise, understandable fashion.
Avoid unnecessary and irrelevant details, repetition or the use of unnecessary technical
language.
The WHEAT REPORT, SEC, DIscLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACrS 77-80 (1968) states that the SEC's
goal is that the prospectus be a summary. Because of a fear the courts would interpret the term
"material fact" expansively-a fear that has now been realized--cautious counsel, however, have
often summarized at length rather than briefly. See Dean, supra note 41, at 157-61.
62 Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L REV. 755, 763-64 (1959)
[hereinafter referred to as Wade]. Cf. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821 (1961), noted in 75 HARv. L. REv. 620 (1962).
63 See Wade, supra note 62, at 764-65 (citing English cases). Cf. Dean, supra note 41,
at 160-61.
64 For a hypothesis that, at least in a public company, only a few items of accounting data
are crucial, see Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Re-
quirements, in EcONOMIc PoLIcY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 31-
41 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
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ation of concise documents. It is on essential matters that investigators,
draftsmen and regulators should concentrate. To the extent that material-
ity becomes all-encompassing, essentials may receive less attention; even
the disclosure documents intended for general consumption will become
catalogs; and every investment loss becomes a potential lawsuit as experts
ferret out little facts that were omitted or imprecisely stated in a disclosure
document.
In most of the classic cases under the securities statutes, the alleged
deficiencies in disclosure have involved essentials-the proposed purchase
of the corporate assets in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.;65 the tremen-
dous inventory appreciation soon to be realized in Speed v. Transamer-
ica Corp.;" the potentially historic mineral discovery in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.;67 the total impact of the defects in the BarChris68 prospectus;
the highly significant dividend cut in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.;69 and the
very substantial difference between the public market price and the price
paid for the stock in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States." Regard-
less of the verbal formulations used in those cases, there can, I think, be
little quibbling about the essential nature of these facts.
However, the formulations-and sometimes the results-in some re-
cent cases have greatly expanded the concept of materiality. In Feit v.
Leasco,71 Judge Weinstein observed that there is "a trend toward broaden-
ing the definition of materiality and concomitantly raising the requirement
of disclosure where the law requires full disclosure."7' 2 He noted that the
formulation in Second Circuit decisions has moved from whether a reason-
able man would have been influenced to act differently to whether a rea-
sonable man might well have acted otherwise.7 3  The Supreme Court's
formulations in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.74 and Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens75 have been that a reasonable investor "might have considered" the
facts important. In Feit v. Leasco76 Judge Weinstein held that a fact is
material "when it is more probable than not that a significant number of
traders would have wanted to know it before deciding to deal in the secur-
ity at the time and price in question.'"7  He then stated that
" 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
6699 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
67401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
68Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
6940 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
70406 U.S. 128 (1972).
71 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
721d. at 571 (citations omitted).
73 Id. at 569-70.
74 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
75 406 U.S. at 153-54.
76 See note 71 supra.
77 332 F. Supp. at 571.
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[W]hat is statistically significant will vary with the legal situation... .
Being a formal and legally required document, a prospectus must satisfy a
high standard of disclosure-i.e., disclosure is required when only a rela-
tively small percentage of traders, would want to know before making a
decision. Anything in the order of 10% of either the number of potential
traders or those potentially making 10% of the volumeof sales would seem
to more than suffice.78
This is not far removed from Judge Waterman's statement in Texas Gulf
Sulphur9 that "[t]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets
are also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded
conservative traders," 80
The Second Circuit's opinion in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.8 is an
example of a decison badly stretching the materiality concept. The plain-
tiff, acting upon Smith, Barney's recommendation, purchased four secu-
rities from Smith, Barney. Smith, Barney executed and confirmed as dealer,
but failed to disclose that it was one of several market makers in the secu-
rities. Smith, Barney offered to prove that plaintiff purchased at the lowest
possible price. The Second Circuit, agreeing with the district court's hold-
ing that Smith, Barney's failure to disclose its market maker status was
an omission of a material fact in violation of rule lob-5, affirmed the lower
court's judgment for $18,000 in "damages," the difference between the pur-
chase price and the price at which the plaintiff later sold the securities.
Judge Friendly's dissent emphasized the minimal dangers and the prob-
able advantage in dealing with a market maker and argued that Smith,
Barney was at least entitled to a new trial on the issues of materiality and
reliance. The majority opinion, however, stating the materiality test to be
"whether a reasonable man in [the plaintiff's] position might well have
acted otherwise than to purchase ..- if the disclosure had been made,
found the omission material.
The expansion of "material facts" has, I believe, proceeded to the
point at which counsel has minimal assurance that exclusion of any non-
trivial information from the disclosure process is satisfactory because of
the material fact limitation. Counsel's burden in stating that he knows of
no material half-truth or omission is, therefore, broad-ranging and inde-
terminate, especially since both counsel will have performed considerable
investigation and since company counsel may have acted as general coun-
sel for years.
78 Id.
79 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
80 401 F.2d at 849.
81438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971).
82Id. at 1171.
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C. Who Are Corporate Counsel's Clients?
Ethical Consideration 5-18 of the American Bar Association's Code of
Professional Responsibility attempts to establish a strict entity theory for
the corporation's counsel:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation ... owes his allegiance
to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee . . . or
other person connected with the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer
should keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should
not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or organization.
Occasionally a lawyer for an entity is requested by a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representatives, or other person connected with the entity
to represent him in an individual capacity; in such case the lawyer may serve
the individual only if the lawyer is convinced that different interests are
not present.
Opinion 202 of the ABA's Committee on Legal Ethics,83 issued in
1940, designated the board of directors as the ultimate embodiment of the
corporate entity. An attorney retained by a corporation learned of ques-
tionable activities by its officers and was convinced that the officers would
not fully report to the board of directors. The committee held that the
attorney should disclose to the board of directors as it is the corporation's
"governing body." This disclosure was found to be consistent with the
canon requiring preservation of client confidences because the disclosure
would be "to the client itself and not to a third person." Although the
issue was not explicitly raised, I think it informative that the committee
did not discuss the possibility of disclosure to the shareholders. Counsel
retained by corporations have not considered shareholders to be their
clients, although shareholders are the ultimate owners of the corporate as-
sets and indirectly pay counsel's bills. That traditional view must be re-
examined in light of the Fifth Circuit's 1970 decision in Garner v. Wolf-
inbarger.s4
In Garner shareholders who had purchased stock from the corporation
sued the corporation and its officers in a class and derivative action. The
complaint alleged violations of the registration and antifraud sections of
the securities statutes. The shareholders attempted to discover communi-
cations between the corporation's retained counsel and the corporation and
its officers. The corporation asserted the attorney-client privilege. The
district court, in what was apparently the first reported American case on
the subject, held the privilege unavailable against the stockholders as
plaintiffs.
The Fifth Circuit held that, where good cause is shown, the privilege
88 AMBR. BAR Assoc, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAl ETHics 486 (1967).
84Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
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cannot be asserted by a corporation in litigation between it and its share-
holders if the latter are charging the corporation and its officers with acts
injurious to shareholder interests. The court listed several factors to be
considered in determining whether good cause exists. The list and the
opinion seem heavily weighted toward- an affirmative answer in most cases
if shareholders show a colorable claim, good faith and are seeking to dis-
cover advice which related to prospective transacions. After the Fifth Cir-
cuit remanded, the lower court found good cause present. 5
The Fifth Circuit's decision built upon, but proceeded well beyond,
two traditional exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. The first is al-
leged communications in contemplation of a crime or fraud. The second
is of more interest here. The court's analysis of the position of counsel
to a corporation led it to conclude that counsel is a type of joint attorney
-both the corporation and its shareholders are his clients.
Like most decisions creating law sharply departing from prior practices,
Garner v. Wolfinbarger produces numerous uncertainties. For example,
one of the court's footnotes states in what apparently is dictum:
We do not consider it determinative whether the attorney consulted is
corporate or house counsel or whether his fees are paid for by ... manage-
ment on its own account.86
There is little quarrel with the identical treatment of house counsel and
outside counsel paid by the corporation, for one of the court's more telling
observations was that "management is not managing for itself." But if
management retains its own counsel and pays the fees for advice to man-
agement alone, there appears to be a clear absence of the shareholders as
clients and every reason to uphold the privilege, absent a communication
in contemplation of fraud or a crime. Indeed, one of the predictable re-
sults of Garner and the increasing emphasis upon the duties of corporate
counsel to investors will be an increase in arm's length dealing between
counsel and management in those few areas in which the interests of man-
agement and investors diverge or appear to do so, and there will be instances
when management will be well advised to retain and pay for its own coun-
sel to advise it alone.
The opinion does not specify whether the suing shareholders must have
been such at the time of the communications between counsel and the cor-
poration in order to effect discovery. A common counsel analysis suffers in
persuasiveness when the communications precede the time the shareholder
obtained his stock. As I read the opinions in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,
however, the shareholders were attempting to reach communications relat-
ing to the offerings in which they became shareholders. Allowing share-
holder status to relate back to the commencement of the plans for the of-
85 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
86 430 F.2d 1102 n.18.
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fering is, of course, no stranger to the law: this legal fiction was the key
to Judge Rugg's promoters' liability opinions in the Old Dominion cases.87
Moreover, the portion of the Fifth Circuit's opinion dealing with the crime-
fraud exception declared that "management has an obligation to the cor-
poration, to the stockholders and to the public to do what is lawful.""8
It is also unclear how Garner v. Wolfinbarger interacts with the injunc-
tions in Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility regulating
conflicts of interest. Preconditions to representation of multiple clients
are: (1) that the attorney can obviously represent the interests of each;
and (2) consent by each after full disclosure of the possible effects of the
multiple representation on the exercise of the lawyer's independent pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of each.89 I doubt that the court was inti-
mating that shareholders should participate in the selection of corporate
counsel, or that it would be proper, even after disclosure and consent, for
corporate counsel to represent the entity and prospective shareholders when
the conflict is great-say, in negotiating the terms of a new stock issue.
These were, of course, questions not before the court. The question before
the court was whether counsel represented multiple clients, which the court
answered in the affirmative. In any event, the long range interests of all
parties in securities transactions-the corporate entity (including officers
and directors), pre-existing shareholders, creditors, underwriters, and public
purchasers-are fairly congruent in terms of compliance with the securities
laws, because lawful disclosure documents and avoiding reliance upon un-
available exemptions from registration prevent liability and preserve con-
tractual arrangements agreed upon after fair disclosure.
The American Bar -Association, as amicus curiae, had argued that max-
imum compliance with the law would be the result of upholding the priv-
ilege. The Fifth Circuit's opinion summarized the ABA's position:
The ABA urges that the privilege is most necessary where the corpora-
tion has sought advice about a prospective transaction, where counsel in
good faith has stated his opinion that it is not lawful, but the corpora-
tion has proceeded in total or partial disregard of counsel's advice. The
ABA urges that the cause of justice requires that counsel be free to state
his opinion as fully and forthrightly as possible without fear of later dis-
closure to persons who might attack the transaction, and that without the
cloak of the privilege counsel may be required by the threat of future dis-
covery to hedge or soften their opinion.90
The court was unpersuaded:
87 Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 186-93, 89
N.E. 193, 205-08 (1909); Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 188
Mass. 315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905).
88430 F.2d at 1103 (emphasis supplied).
89 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RSPONSlBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-105 (B).
0430 F.2d at 1102.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
However, we reject the idea that the prospective decision of the client
on whether to abide by advice or disregard it, or the guarantee of a veil of
secrecy, either establishes or narrows the attorney's obligation in the giving
of advice. And to grant to corporate management plenary assurance of
secrecy for opinions received is to encourage it to disregard with impunity
the advice sought.9'
Garner v. Wolfinbarger does not, I believe, answer a separate set of
questions that may arise when shareholders sue the corporation and its
management. The trend of the decisions in derivative actions in which
the corporation is a nominal defendant and the actual defendants are
management is to require new independent counsel for the corporate en-
tity and to allow the corporate counsel to represent management.92 This
has been justified on the ground that corporate counsel is in fact closely
allied with management and on the additional ground that counsel should
defend his own work and advice when it is attacked. 3 If, however, coun-
sel has indeed been a counsel for shareholders, is it proper for him to ap-
pear on behalf of management? The courts should be slow to use Gar-
ner's reasoning concerning the attorney-client privilege to disqualify
corporate counsel from representing management in a derivative action or
to represent the corporation and management in a class action against them
if management has acted upon counsel's advice.
Two recent cases have held that corporate counsel cannot later bring a
derivative action against his former client.9 4 The opinions rely upon the
concept of attorney-client confidences and implicitly exclude the share-
holders as clients. The concept that a lawyer should defend his work will
probably allow corporate counsel to represent management in derivative ac-
tions and the corporation and management in class actions when there is
an attack on his advice. This area will be highly troubled, however. If
the attorney has potential liability to the corporation, the conflict between
counsel and the corporate entity in a class action could easily preclude rep-
resentation. The central thought, however, is that identification of share-
holders" as clients for purposes of the attorney-client privilege should not be
mported uncritically into motions for disqualification from representation.
The ultimate justification for the holding in Garner v. Wolfinbarger is
that a significant modification of the attorney-client privilege in litigation
between the corporation and shareholders maximizes the probability that
counsel's injunctions against activities he opines are wrongful will be fol-
91Id.
92 See N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS, & R. BUXBAUM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS, 871-72 (4th ed. 1968).
93 See Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. Marco v. Dulles,
169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dism'd, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959).
04 Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., [1972-1793 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 5 93,675 (3d Cit. 1972); Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); but cf.
Rubin v. Katz, 347 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537 (D. Nev. 1972).
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lowed because a failure to follow the advice can be discovered and used
to establish the most severe civil liabilities against management. If man-
agement follows counsel's advice to the effect that a transaction is proper,
the newly discovered client relationship with shareholders should not dis-
qualify counsel when he defends those who relied upon that advice.
In addition to increasing management compliance with counsel's secur-
ities advice, Garner may also expand the classes of persons to whom the
attorney's professional duties run. By creating privity between corporate
counsel and shareholders and incipient shareholders for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege, Garner may provide the impetus for a similar
analysis of the attorney's duties in giving securities advice. For example,
in sales of stock by the corporation, counsel would find himself character-
ized as representing clients with conflicting interests and subject to the
high duties of disclosure and fair dealing which accompany that status."5
The increased duties to shareholders in the disclosure work undertaken
by an attorney are obvious; being a counsel to the situation is demanding.
There is nothing implausible in this analysis. By representing the issuer
and yet giving a detailed opinion to underwriters, counsel places himself
in much the same status vis-4-vis disclosure documents.96 He is in privily
with both the issuer and the underwriters and owes duties, admittedly
somewhat ambiguous, to both in the disclosure process.
The duties of care concerning disclosure that counsel owes to the cor-
porate entity may also directly flow to shareholders and prospective pur-
chasers.17 Until now, cases holding lawyers liable for their negligence to
persons other than their clients and the addressees of their opini6ns have
not been common. 8 If shareholders and prospective shareholders are
clients along with the corporate entity, the privity citadel may be bypassed.9
In the immediately following section, I shall discuss two areas in which
such an analysis would raise especially perplexing questions for corporate
counsel.
D. Uncertainties Concerning Subsequent Developments and
Subsequent Discovery of Earlier Disclosure Deficiencies
Recent decisions have created strong pressures to bring to investors'
attention the subsequent discovery of major defects in earlier disclosure
95 Cf. R. KEETON, INSURANcE LAW § 7.7 (1971).
96 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
9 7This question was not before the court in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The extrapolation from the holding in that
case may be inviting, however.
" 98 For a discussion of exceptions to this principle in California, see Lathrop & Rinehart,
supra note 20, at 462-70.
99 Indeed, the joint client analysis in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) will, I believe, be the theory used to bypass the priv-
ity limitations.
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documents and subsequent developments materially concerning earlier dis-
closures on which investors are still relying. These problems are difficult
enough when the attorney advises the client on its course of action. They
become painfully perplexing when the attorney must determine his own
independent obligations, and especially if shareholders as well as the cor-
poration are his clients. Let me first generally review the authorities on
subsequent discoveries of error and subsequent developments and then
speculate about the attorney's independent obligations.
The allegations ruled on in Fischer v. Kletz,100 the leading case, were
that subsequent to the release of its certificate an accounting firm discov-
ered that the figures in the company's annual report were substantially
false and misleading, but did not timely inform the SEC, shareholders, or
the trading market. The plaintiff alleged damages because of trading
market purchases in reliance upon annual report figures. The court held
that causes of action against the accountants were alleged under common
law principles and rule lob-5. The theory of the allegations was not
aiding or abetting an alleged violation by the company, 1° but the more
direct one, that the accountants failed to discharge their own duty to share-
holders and prospective shareholders. Late in 1969 the AICPA issued
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 41, Subsequent Discovery of Facts
Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report, treating this issue as cir-
cumspectly as possible. On a prospective basis, the Statement appears
largely to codify Fischer v. Kletz, but the AICPA asserted that the State-
ment "establishes procedures which go beyond current practice and ... is
not intended to be retroactive.' 1 .0 2
Some of the cases discussed in Fischer concerned a related issue-whether
one who has made a statement on which he knows others to be relying
must disclose a change or subsequent event necessary to keep the earlier
statement from being materially misleading. Considerable authority an-
swers affirmatively, and Fischer relied upon that authority to hold as it did
concerning the subsequent discovery of a fact existing but unknown at the
time of the earlier statement.10 3
The AICPA's Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 47, Subsequent
Events,' 4 is a careful, effective warning to accountants of subsequent-events
problems and, perhaps more importantly, attempts to establish a low level
of duty to discover subsequent events bearing upon statements certified
100 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
101 Concerning aiding and abetting, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Ruder].
102 AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 41, SUBSEQUENT DIScOVERY
OF FAcTS ExSTING AT THE DATE OF THE AUDiTOR'S REPORT (1969).
103In addition to the cases cited in Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
see Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941).
104 AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 47, SUBSEQUENT EVENTS (1971).
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earlier. When the law requires reissuance of the statements at a later date
-most importantly, when used in a later Securities Act prospectus-the
Statement attempts to codify a very manageable level of investigation for
accountants.
Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp."5 demon-
strates the importance of the proper disclosure of updating facts and the
conflicting pressures which the securities laws place upon management.
According to the allegations, in the early part of 1966, McDonnell Doug-
las had publicly predicted substantial earnings for the first half of the fiscal
year. On June 7 it issued a preliminary prospectus showing earnings for
the first five months of 1966 of 85 cents per share. The plaintiff purchased
80,000 shares on the open market on June 22 and June 23. On June 24
McDonnell Douglas announced that its earnings for the first half of the
year would be 12 cents per share, and plaintiff sold its stock during the
next two weeks at a loss of about $2 million.
Plaintiff apparently did not allege specific reliance upon the public an-
nouncements or the preliminary prospectus, but rather was alleging that
the market had been affected by them. Plaintiff claimed that the an-
nouncement should have been issued several days before it was. The dis-
trict judge refused to set aside the jury's $700,000 verdict for plaintiff, but
the Tenth Circuit reversed in a confusing opinion and ordered judgment
entered for the defendant. The decision can be read as holding that the
disclosure of a new development to the trading markets is a matter en-
trusted to the business judgment of management. However, a more plaus-
ible reading, and one that would make the most sense out of the opinion,
is that the defendant's management exercised reasonable care and dispatch
in pursuing the first indications of trouble in late May and making the an-
nouncement of reduced earnings only after a careful study of the extent
of the problem. Texas Gulf Sulphur'0° requires reasonable care in the
preparation of press releases, and management should not be faulted for
taking the time to investigate and verify before an announcement is made.
The Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.07
has firmly upheld an updating requirement. The court held that in a Se-
curities Act registration, a material development after the effective date
but during the distribution period should be reflected by a sticker amend-
ment or by supplementary material delivered with the prospectus in order
to avoid violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act and rule iob-5. In-
105 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 93,773 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'g [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCI- FED. SEC. L REP. 5 93,004. For other earlier opinions below, see [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 92,811; [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L
REP. 5 92,760.
106 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
107458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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deed, the court even accepted the SEC's argument that a failure to reflect
such changes would cause the use of the unchanged prospectus to run afoul
of § 5. This latter holding seems wrong (§§ 11, 12(2), and 17(a) of the
Securities Act and rule lob-5-and not §§ 5 and 12(l)-seem designed
for the defective prospectus filed with the SEC and allowed to become or
remain effective) but it does illustrate the court's eagerness to encourage
updating of the prospectus during the distribution period.
In its recent decisioh in In re Butcher and Sherrard,108 the SEC held
that a broker-dealer violates the antifraud rules by communicating a change
in the firm's recommendation concerning a stock to only a preferred group
of customers.
Rule 14a-9, the antifraud provision of the proxy rules, prohibits solicita-
tion-
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement
in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for
the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.' 09
This tells us that if there is more than one volley of soliciting material,
each must update that material in earlier solicitations which has become
false or misleading. It does not state, however, whether there is a duty to
correct earlier material which has become misleading since the final solici-
tation."' As we have seen, this ambiguity could become a major issue in
the National Student Marketing litigation."'
The "K" reports and proxy statements under the Exchange Act are not
designed to continuously update all of the company's Exchange Act or Se-
curities Act registration statement. Rather, the "K" reports and proxy
statements need cover only the enumerated, limited items plus enough ad-
ditional information to prevent that given from being misleading. The
result of this is that no universal updating requirement is found in either
the "K" reports or the proxy rules. In contrast, information in broker-
dealer registration forms must constantly be amended to reflect subsequent
events." 2
The most widely applicable provision is rule lob-5. Especially since
Texas Gulf Sulphur,"la everyone now recognizes that when the company
108 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 79,135 (SEC 1972). The opinion was issued pursuant to
an offer of settlement submitted without admitting or denying the allegations in the order for
proceedings.
109 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
110 Note, however, that there may be oral solicitations after the final written one. Those
oral solicitations appear to be subject to the updating requirement.
For an expansive view of the updating requirements in rule 14a-9, see Gould v. American
Hawaiian Steamship Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,682 (D.
Del. 1972).
111 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
12 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b3-1(b) (1972).
113 See cases cited note 106 supra.
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does issue a press release or report to shareholders, reasonable care must be
exercised to prepare a document free of material misstatements or half-
truths, and that if a material development has not been disclosed to the
markets, insiders and the company must refrain from taking advantage
of the hiatus in information. Furthermore, the SEC has recently adopted
a specific rule under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act' 14 requiring appropriate
advance disclosure to the trading markets of dividend payments," 5 and I
believe § 10(b) clearly would authorize a rule requiring prompt disclosure
to the trading markets of all material developments." 6  At present, how-
ever, it is unclear what duties of affirmative disclosure of material develop-
ments to the trading markets are imposed by rule lOb-5. The SEC has
not helped by cryptically declaring that issuance of routine quarterly re-
ports may be misleading without disclosure of other developments." 7
My point, however, is different. Discussion of a possible rule 10b-5
duty of affirmative disclosure of material developments to the trading
markets has tended to focus on the development without considering their
relation to earlier disclosures. Considering reports to shareholders,
speeches to analysts, press releases, "K" reports and Securities Act registra-
tion statements, a company with a trading market has, at any point in time,
fed vast amounts of information into the market within the fairly recent
past. Rarely will a material development occurring since the last public dis-
closure not have a logical nexus with several items of the earlier informa-
tion. Furthermore this is widely recognized in connection with merger
negotiations, lawsuits and earnings projections: everyone quickly announces
material changes from the earlier announced status in these areas. The
principle seems broader, however. Suppose an annual report discussed
highly material new contracts, but three months later significant serious
interpretational disputes with the other party arise. Counsel and the com-
pany's executives recognize a considerable possibility of litigation and that
a judicial determination adverse to the company is also a real possibility.
Does rule 10b-5 require prompt disclosure of the dispute for the benefit
of the trading markets?
Fischer, the leading disclosure case, involved an accountant's certificate.
Lawyers have assumed that the duties and liabilities of accountants and
lawyers in the disclosure process are fundamentally different. Accoun-
tants, it is said, undertake a public duty. Lawyers are thought, however, to
114Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
115 17 C.F.R. § 240.lob-17 (1972).
116See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) : "Section
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Cf. Sommer, The Animal Re-
port: A Prime Disclosure Document, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1093.
"17 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), discussed in Dayan, Correcting
Errors in the Press, REVIEW OF SEcuiuEs REGULATION, 941-45 (April 6, 1972) (good
treatment of correction and updating requirements).
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be advisers to and advocates for the issuer. 118  Garner may lead to the
demise of the distinction.
Consider, for example, the situation in which counsel to a publicly
owned issuer opined to underwriters that he knew of no material misstate-
ments or omissions in a prospectus. A few weeks later counsel discovers
a material omission in the narrative material. The prospectus is affect-
ing the trading markets. I see little policy reason for distinguishing be-
tween counsel's position in this situati6n and the position of the accountant
who later discovers a material missstatement in the audited financials.
Though the issuer's counsel does not agree to make a reasonable investiga-
tion of the narrative portion of the prospectus, had he known of the mate-
rial omitted fact during the preparation process he would have insisted
upon inclusion-and would have had his way, for no major securities
transaction will close in the absence of an opinion that the issuer's counsel
knows of no material misstatement or omission in the disclosure documents.
There is obviously a difference in the initial duty of the accountant and
the attorney in terms of the factual investigation, but once there is knowl-
edge of a material defect in the portion of the disclosure document passed
upon by them, it seems artificial and decidedly contrary to the purposes of
the securities laws to treat the attorney differently from the accountant.
Conceiving of the lawyer as counsel to shareholders and prospective share-
holders for purposes of determining his duties to the trading markets is,
therefore, a distinct possibility.
If the corporation's counsel is thought to represent the corporation and
its present and prospective shareholders, he may also have an independent
duty to the trading markets to ensure that his knowledge of subsequent
major developments affecting earlier disclosure documents prepared by him
be disclosed, assuming the earlier disclosures still affect the trading mar-
kets. This precise question will, however, seldom arise. Counsel's advice
to the corporation will invariably be to disclose the subsequent develop-
ment in order to prevent liability, and management will normally have
every inducement to follow the advice. A subsequent development usu-
ally will imply no defect in the earlier disclosure, so that disclosure of the
subsequent development can most often only prevent liability and not gen-
erate it.
There may, however, be more resistance by counsel and management
to the disclosure of a subsequently discovered material error in an earlier
disclosure document. Counsel may make the discovery in the course of
his continuing representation of the corporation, and the error may raise
questions of counsel's liability. A public confession of error is not a de-
light. If the error was in a Securities Act registration statement and the
statute of limitations has not run at the time of discovery, announcement
118 For strong positions to this effect, see Karmel supra note 26, and Freeman, supra note 26.
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of the error may invite liability, for even reasonable care and reliance up-
on experts are not defenses for the issuer under § 11. On the other hand,
if the trading markets are still relying upon the disclosure document, con-
cealment is probably a fraud by the corporation, management,119 and the
attorney, Furthermore, issuance of subsequent financials and other dis-
closure documents without revealing the contingent liability created by theknown material error may violate the antifraud rules. The statutes of
-limitations may also be tolled during the concealment. In short, even the
most pragmatic calculas may point to disclosure.
Suppose, however, that there is no possibility of a trading market andlittle possibility of reliance by those who purchase from the initial pur-
chasers on the disclosure document in which there is a subsequently dis-
covered major error. A private offering of the stock of a newly formed
corporation pursuant to an informal offering circular delivered to the pur-
chasers before closing and relied upon by them supplies an excellent ex-
ample. Suppose the purchasers required the opinion of counsel to the
corporation as a condition of closing, and that his opinion contained the
customary language that to counsel's knowledge there was no material
omission or half-truth in the offering circular. Though counsel actually
knew of no such defects when his opinion was delivered, he discovered onetwo months later and reported it to management (the promoters). It is,let us assume, clear that the purchasers would have a good cause of action
under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. Fischer v. Kletz is not directly rele-
vant here, for in that case the plaintiffs were trading market purchasers whohad acquired their stock after the alleged discovery of the earlier error.This is the most difficult possible question concerning the corporation's
obligation to disclose a subsequently discovered error. For counsel, thequestion of his independent duty to disclose is excruciating. His opinion
at closing was addressed to the purchasers and if he had known then whathe now knows, either his opinion would not have issued or, more likely
the disclosure would have appeared in the offering circular and the price
would have differed or the deal would have folded. If the purchasers
are his clients along with the corporation, he may have an independent
duty to alert the purchasers so they can assert their rights.12 0
E. Uncertainties Concerning the Requirements Imposed by
the Antifraud Provisions upon Attorneys for Factual and
Legal Certainty
1. The Antifraud Provisions
As noted above, the securities statutes seldom deal explicitly with the
119 Cf. Fischer v. Ketz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
120 Cf. R. KEETON, INSURANcE LAW 494-95 n.9 (1971). See also text accompanying notes
147-49, 165-66 infra.
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duties of lawyers. Section 11 of the Securities Act, which creates express
liabilities for deficient registration statements, sometimes applies to at-
torneys' opinions, but only to those few opinions that are referred to in
the prospectus and as to which the attorney files, a consent to use. When
the attorney is subject to § 11, he probably must use reasonable care in
ascertaining the facts on which his opinion is based as well as in ascer-
taining and applying the law; his duties run to all purchasers, whether
or not in privity with him.
Section 12 of the Securities Act creates two express remedies. Section
12(1) applies when there is noncompliance with the registration require-
ments of § 5; due care defenses are apparently not available if § 5 is in
fact violated. Section 12(2) is an antifraud provision applicable to mate-
rial misstatements of fact or half-truths in the sale of any security, regis-
tered or unregistered; no liability attaches if the defendant shows "that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission."'"' The express remedies under § 12 of the
Securities Act have seldom been applied in connection with persons acting
as attorneys because § 12 reaches only defendants who offer or sell a se-
curity; as stated in W'onneman v. Stratford Securities Co.122: "The defen-
dant must be, for example, the actual seller or one who negotiated the
sale; the owner of the securities sold or a person who in some manner con-
trols the seller."'1 23 ' In Wonneman, the attorney did the legal work incident
to reviving a dormant corporation and revamping it so that its shares
could- be sold publicly. The actual sales were induced by the attorney's
erroneous oral opinion to a seller that the securities were exempt from
registration. Although the court found that the sales violated § 5, the
attorney was held beyond the ambit of § 12(1) .124
Judge Friendly's opinion in Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.' 25 demonstrates
that an attorney who solicits is within § 12. There, a person acting as
attorney for the issuer as well as for a broker-dealer promoting an un-
registered offering of the issuer's stock was among the defendants in a §
12(1) action. Evidence warranted a possible inference that the attorney
"had not simply answered [the investor's] questions but had placed [the
broker-dealer] in a position to tackle [the investor] for the money."' 26
The court thus reversed the district judge's action in dismissing the com-
plaint against the attorney at the close of plaintiff's case, holding that "a
jury could properly decide that [the attorney] had been a party to a solici-
121 Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
122 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
123 Id. at p. 93,459.
124 There was apparently no rule lOb-5 allegation in this case.
125411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
126 Id. at 1053.
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tation.'" 7 Katz raises the question whether a lawyer who drafts a disclo-
sure document is a party to a "solicitation" for purposes of §§ 12(1) and
12(2). If § 12(2) is triggered, is the document drafted by counsel "his"
statement so that if there is a material omission or half-truth, he must
3rove "that, he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of such untruth or omission" ?""8 I suspect thit the an-
swer to this is that a disclosure document drafted by an attorney for use by
a client and issued under the client's name is the client's solicitation, and
not the attorney's, for purposes of § 12. Katz is distinguishable in that the
attorney allegedly went beyond a pure attorney's function and tried to sell
the securities. Attorneys often do this, and their § 12 exposure is large for
that reason. I doubt, however, that the purely professional functions of
rendering legal opinions and drafting disclosure documents for use by
clients are covered by § 12.
The discussion in the remainder of this section is restricted to the anti-
fraud rules, primarily rule lob-5. Those rules are the proscriptions most
directly applicable to attorneys because there is no privity requirement (the
proscribed act need only be in connection with any purchase or sale by
any person), because all securities transactions are reached by those rules,
and because the proscriptions of fraud and material misstatements and
half-truths in the rules obviously are pertinent to attorneys' advice and
opinion-giving functions. I will also place to one side the lawyer's obliga-
tions as a controlling person because the lawyer will most often not be a
controlling person and because even when he is, his pivotal role in secu-
rities transactions should cast upon him direct duties under the antifraud
rules that are at least as demanding as those of a controlling person.
As discussed earlier, attorneys draft or place in final form the narrative
portion of most disclosure documents. They are expected by their clients
to perform considerable factual investigation, though how much is unspec-
ified. At the same time they have attempted to limit their responsibility
for factual accuracy and completeness. When lawyers opine on exemp-
tions from registration, another technique for attempting to avoid entangle-
ment in factual investigation is often adopted: the client will supply facts,
the opinion letter will recite the version of the facts that has been supplied
and the source (thus negating independent verification by the attorney),
and the favorable opinion will be expressly based upon those facts. As we
have noted, securities opinions, even on close questions, are usually issued
"clean" or not at all; probability assessments are seldom included. These
,practices create nice questions under state law concerning the lawyer's ex-
posure to clients whenever there is a material factual deficiency or courts
127 Id.
128 This is the language of the due care defense in Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §
771(2) (1970).
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disagree with the attorney's legal conclusion. These same questions, in
slightly altered form, arise again under the antifraud rules.
In light of the attorney's pivotal position in securities regulation, it
seems strange that 40 years after the enactment of the two key federal
statutes, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, only a few SEC releases
and judicial opinions discuss the duties of factual investigation which the
antifraud rules impose upon counsel. There is even less authority on a re-
lated question-the certainty on the law needed before a clean, favorable
opinion should properly emerge. This paucity of authority can be attrib-
uted primarily to the reluctance of attorneys to sue or blame their brothers,
a reluctance which SEC attorneys seem to be shedding and which may di-
minish even more sharply if a specialized plaintiffs securities litigation bar
develops and the realization spreads that large law firms and their liability
policies often represent the deepest available pocket.
2. Factual Invesfigation and Inquiry Notice
In Securities Act Release No. 4445, Distribution by Broker-Dealers of
Unregistered Securities, issued in 1962, the SEC touched upon its views of
the obligation of counsel to investigate underlying facts before opining:
There have been a number of cases in which dealers have unsuccessfully
sought to justify a claim to exemption under Section 4(1) of the Securities
Act simply by securing from the sellers, actual or ostensible, representations
that such persons are neither officers, directors, nor large stockholders of
the issuer, and submitting such representations to an attorney who then gives
an opinion to the effect that, assuming the correctness of such representa-
tions, exemption under Section 4(1) is available. Obviously an attorney's
opinion based upon hypothetical facts is worthless if the facts are not as
specified, or if unspecified but vital facts are not considered. Because of
this, it is the practice of responsible counsel not to furnish an opinion con-
cerning the availability of an exemption from registration under the Secur-
ities Act for a contemplated distribution unless such counsel have them-
selves carefully examined all of the relevant circumstances and satisfied
themselves, to the extent possible, that the contemplated transaction is, in
fact, not a part of an unlawful distribution. Indeed, if an attorney fur-
nishes an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts which he has made
no effort to verify, and if he knows that his opinion will be relied upon
as the basis for a substantial distribution of unregistered securities, a serious
question arises as to the propriety of his professional conduct.
The Release seems to condemn the described practice even for those sit-
uations in which the opinion letter states that the exemption holds only if
the represented facts are true. 2 9 The Release implies that securities opin-
ions which lack fact-vouching are rare. Opinions on material omissions
and misstatements are always given in this form, however. Furthermore,
129 This indicates that counsel does not stand behind the represented facts, except perhaps
for no knowledge of falsity.
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counsels' opinions on exemptions often express reliance upon facts supplied
by others.
The Release thus poses a serious issue, for the SEC seems to take the
view here that it follows on an accounting method inconsistent with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles-that no amount of disclosure cures
the defect. 80 The scope of the Release can, however, probably be inter-
preted in accordance with its terms as limited to opinions on exemptions.
A lawyer's opinion that an exemption exists is crucial, for it is the passkey
used to avoid registration with the SEC and that agency's opportunity to
examine disclosure documents before a sale is made. At the same time,
a. reasonable investigation of the underlying facts preparatory to furnish-
ing an opinion on an exemption is usually a much lighter burden than a
reasonable investigation of the facts in a prospectus.
United States v. Simon' holds, by direct analogy, that counsel's lack
of good faith belief in the correctness of facts or his legal conclusions
could constitute criminal scienter and, a fortiori scienter and sufficient
participation for civil liability under rule lob-5. But is more than good
faith required? For example, § 11 of the Securities Act establishes an "in-
quiry notice" standard for one relying upon an expert's statement. If the
statement contains a material misstatement, omission or half-truth, persons
other than the expert are excused from liability if they show that they "had
no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe" that the deficiency
existed. No "reasonable investigation" is required. This inquiry notice
standard, which lies between good faith belief and reasonable belief after
reasonable investigation (the usual standard under § 11), requires one to
investigate possible defects concerning which he has been put on notice.
The standards imposed by the antifraud rules are discussed in the Sec-
ond Circuit's 1968 decision in SEC v. Frank."a An offering circular used
in an intrastate offering contained alleged inaccuracies in the description of
a chemical additive produced by the company. The SEC obtained a tem-
porary injunction against the company (by consent) and against the law-
yer, Frank. The SEC alleged that Frank had actual knowledge of inac-
curacies in the description of the additive. The injunction forbade Frank
from drafting any statement containing material misstatements or half-
truths about the additive. Frank appealed to the Second Circuit, maintain-
ing that company officers had drafted the description and that his func-
tion had been that of a scrivener untutored in chemistry helping the
officers to place their ideas in proper form. The following passage from
130 See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC AOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2.6-2.10 (3d ed.
1972).
181 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970).
182 SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Judge Friehdly's opinion identifies the standards imposed by the antifraud
rules and states the inquiry notice issue:
Although Frank makes much of this being the first instance in which
the Commission has obtained an injunction against an attorney for partic-
ipation in the preparation of an allegedly mislealing offering circular or
prospectus, we find this unimpressive. As this court said in United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.
Ct. 1631, 12 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1964), "In our complex society the accoun-
tant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or crowbar." A lawyer has no
privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard to securities which
he knows to be false simply because his client has furnished it to him. At
the other extreme it would be unreasonable to hold a lawyer who was put-
ting his client's description of a chemical process into understandable En-
glish to be guilty of fraud simply because of his failure to detect discrep-
ancies between their description and technical reports available to him in a
physical sense but beyond his ability to understand. The instant case lies
between these extremes. The SEC's position is that Frank had been fur-
nished with information which even a non-expert would recognize as show-
ing the falsity of many of the representations quoted in fn. 1, notably those
implying extensive and satisfactory testing at factories and indicating that
all had gone passing well at the test by the Army Laboratories. If this is
so, the Commission would be entitled to prevail; a lawyer, no more than
others, can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and
could readily understand. ... Whether the fraud sections of the securities
laws go beyond this and require a lawyer passing on an offering circular to
run down possible infirmities in his client's story of which he has been put
on notice, and if so what efforts are required of him, is a closer question
K" on which it is important that the court be seized of the precise facts, in-
cluding the extent, as the SEC claimed with respect to Frank, to which his
role went beyond a lawyer's normal one. Compare Securities Act of 1933,
§ 11(a).133
The judgment below was reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the Second Circuit's opinion.
In 1972, the SEC lost an interesting injunctive case against an attorney.
In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,'84 the SEC sought to tag an attorney, who had
issued an allegedly erroneous favorable opinion on an exemption from reg-
istration under the Securities Act, with status as a statutory "underwriter"
and an aider and abettor. The district court found against the SEC on
both charges. The defendant was not an underwriter, said the court, since
he had not sold securities and since there was no evidence that securities
were sold on the basis of the alleged misrepresentations in his letter. The
court noted that the SEC had no authority for the proposition "that the
mere preparation of an opinion letter is sufficient to make the preparer an
1331d. at 488-89.
134 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 93,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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underwriter." 3 ' The defendant was absolved of aiding and abetting
due to a lack of evidence that the attorney had knowledge of an improper
scheme and had performed (or omitted to perform) acts necessary to the
furtherance of the scheme. Of the defendant, the court said: "While he
may have been guilty of some negligence in preparing the opinion letter,
there is insufficient evidence to support anything more serious than that."' 0
I have found no other important decisions or SEC Releases on the issue
of what factual investigations counsel must undertake. The recent con-
sent injunction in SEC v. Pig N'Whistle Corp. 1 7 required an indepen-
dent public relations firm reasonably to investigate facts supplied to it by
the client before the firm disseminates public relations materials. Further-
more, broker-dealers and their salesmen must reasonably investigate before
recommending a security. 38 When a lawyer drafts a disclosure document,
which by definition is used in connection with securities transactions, his
role is no less active than that of the public relations firm or the broker-
dealer.
It appears anomalous, therefore, that counsel's duties toward facts are
usually stated in much less demanding formulations than are the duties of
other securities business professionals. On the other hand, since corporate
counsel usually has a continued deep involvement in the corporation's ac-
tivities, a duty to follow through under a standard of inquiry notice may
be as or more demanding. For example, a reasonable investigation by an
unaffiliated broker-dealer recommending a publicly traded security prob-
ably requires less probing than is required of corporate counsel in drafting
an offering circular for use in an unregistered intrastate offering, because
counsel may have inquiry notice of numerous material facts.
3. The Clean Opinion Problem
a. The problem
As discussed earlier, written opinions on securities transactions almost
invariably issue with a flat legal conclusion. Purchase agreements probably
contemplate unqualified opinions. Counsel presenting a written opinion
that, in his judgment, there is an estimated .60 probability that an offering
is exempt or supplying an opinion to underwriters that there is an esti-
mated .70 probability that a fact omitted from the prospectus would be held
1351d. at p. 92,867.
136 Id. at p. 92,868.
137 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc L REP. 5 93,384 (N.D. 111. 1972). See
also BNA SEC. L REP. No. 140, at G-2 (Feb. 14, 1972) (views of SEC concerning the con-
sent injunction).
13 8 See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR.,
CASES ANDl MATERIALS ON SECURrIS REGULATION 821-26 (3d ed. 1972); Note, Security
Salesmen's Failure to Disclose Material Adverse Circimaustances in Recommending Speculative
Security Held to Violate Securties Acts, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1191 (1969).
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immaterial, will probably introduce an unwanted and unacceptable mar-
riage of law and statistics. The same unfavorable result-screams at the
closing or perhaps no closing-may obtain if counsel attempts to convey
by narrative description the same message.
We earlier explored the possibility that a laconic clean opinion on a
puzzle may not be a good idea from the standpoint of counsel's liabilities
to his clients and the recipients of the opinion. In a malpractice action
against the attorney, initiated after the courts have offered a solution to the
puzzle different from his, the client or recipient of the opinion may claim
that a more sophisticated assessment by counsel would have led to a dif-
ferent, less unfavorable course of action. Again the possibility that Gar-
ner'39 may place corporate counsel in the position of counsel to the situa-
tion is pertinent. If corporate counsel is in effect counsel for both the
corporate entity and purchasers, his status as a common counsel increases
his duties of disclosure. No doubt some purchasers would like to know of
significant possibilities that the deal in which they are participating will
breed liabilities against the corporation in which they will be stockholders.
Others, such as a broker-dealer participating in what it hopes is a private
offering and desiring protection in the event of a broker-dealer disciplinary
proceeding, would not be pleased to see counsel's opinion turn into a frank
essay on imponderables.140
Lawyers can control this set of problems by abstractly specifying that
on all points their favorable opinion means only that, they are opining
that the indicated result is more likely than not if the matter were to be
litigated and that no attempt will be made to identify the estimated larger
degree of certainty on any particular point. Lawyers assume, I believe, that
their securities opinions on unsettled law are now so construed by every-
one, but I do not believe that is at all clear, as is evidenced by the cautious,
more explanatory approach taken when an attorney's opinion on a close
point of law is referred to in the prospectus pursuant to counsel's filed
consent.
b. The standard under rule lob-5
Our inquiry here is a different one, however: Does counsel's failure to
put a probability estimate in his opinion on a close question of law make
the opinion a misleading document issued in connection with a securities
transaction and thus a violation of rule lob-5? Texas Gulf Sulphur'4 1
and Feit v. Leasco'42 have introduced highly general probability assess-
139 See note 84 supra and text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
140 But cf. note 193 infra.
141 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
14 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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ments into the determination of whether a fact is material. The most
analogous authority143 suggests, however, that the general antifraud rules
are not violated whenever a clean opinion issues upon counsel's reasonable
belief that the indicated result is more likely than not and are probably
not violated when counsel believes in good faith that the indicated result
is more likely than not.
Ethical Consideration 7-4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
gives the litigator the widest possible latitude. The advocate may urge
any permissible construction of the law and take a position supported by
the law or "supportable by a good faith argument for an extension, modi-
fication or reversal of the law."'1 44 The only limitation is that his position
be non-frivolous and that directly adverse legal authority known to coun-
sel be disclosed if opposing counsel does not do so. 145  The Code, how-
ever, recognizing the distinction between advocate and adviser, cautions
the attorney-adviser to advance the client's interests by "giving his profes-
sional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision
of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the prac-
tical effect of such decision."'14 6 In giving this advice to a client, Disciplin-
ary Rule 6-101 requires the lawyer to act competently. 147
When, however, the Code focuses upon third parties' protection, it is
less clear. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 forbids an attorney to "knowingly
make a false statement of law or fact," or "counsel or assist his client
in conduct ... the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.' 14 More de-
manding is Disciplinary Rule 1-102, which prohibits attorney conduct "in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation," and the limiting
adverb "knowingly" is not found.149  This arguably requires reasonable
research of the law and a reasonable belief that the opined result is the
most likely one.
In 1965, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics issued Opinion
314'r, on an analogous question, whether an attorney must, when the law
is unclear, advise a client to attach a rider to a tax return claiming a non-
segregated deduction or omitting a receipt from inclusion as income. The
opinion states that
[A] lawyer who is asked to advise his client in the course of the preparation
of the client's tax returns may freely urge the statement of positions most
favorable to the client just so long as there is a reasonable basis for these
143See text accompanying notes 144-158 infra.
144 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 7-4.
1451d., ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 7-23.
146 Id., ETHICAL CONSMERATION 7-5.
147Id., DISCIPLINARY RULE 6-101.
148Id., DIsaPLINARY RULE 7-102 (A) (5), (7) (emphasis supplied).
149 Id., DIsCIPLINARY RuLE 1-102 (a) (4) (emphasis supplied).
150 AMER. BAR Assoc., OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETmhcs 688 (1967).
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positions. Thus where the lawyer believes there is a reasonable basis for a.
position that a particular transaction does not result in taxable income or
that certain expenditures are deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty
to advise that riders be attached to the client's tax return explaining the cir-,
cumstances surrounding the transaction or the expenditures. 151
Counsel surely has a reasonable basis for his opinion when he believes it
more likely than not that the undisclosed exclusion or the unsegregated
deduction would be allowed by the courts. "Reasonable basis," however,
might mean only substantial grounds even if the Commissioner apparent-
ly has the better position.
There are good arguments, however, against the latter interpretation.
By definition we are talking about items known by the lawyer to be ques-
tionable. Failure to flag the questionable items by a rider will often re-
move them from scrutiny by the Commissioner and the courts in an adver-
sary proceeding. Substantial arguments falling below an estimated .50+
probability of success can usually be put together by ingenuity and manipu-
lation, and in litigation such arguments would be forcefully advanced
with some chance of success. When, however, the question is fair dis-
closure to the Commissioner, and hence making the self-assessment system
work, a standard of "more likely than not" seems appropriate. This is es-
pecially true since attorneys' opinions provide great protection against pen-
alties. That protection is not likely to continue if Congress and the courts
feel that attorneys commonly issue, on weak grounds, opinions that nondis-
closure is proper.
The case for the opposite conclusion, that only a substantial argument is
needed for the lawyer to conclude that there is a reasonable basis, is force-
ful, however. The Treasury Department is armed with considerable au-
thority to require riders by regulations. 152 In the absence of such regula-
tions, why should the bar do the Treasury's job? If the bar attempts to
push clients toward extensive use of riders without a legal mandate to do
so, endless friction can result. Furthermore, only a semantic difference sep-
arates a standard contemplating substantial arguments and one requiring a
judgment that success in court would be more likely than not. On an un-
settled question of law, an attorney finding substantial arguments would,
perhaps unconsciously, elevate them to an estimated .50+ probability of
success in court if that is the judgment required for him to advise that
nondisclosure is proper.
In United States v. Benjamin,5 ' one of the factors on which the Second
Circuit relied in affirming the criminal conviction of a lawyer for viola-
1511d. at 691.
152 See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 6001, 6011 (a); Bittker, Professional Responsi-
bility in the Preparation of Federal Income Tax Returns in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
FEDERAL TAX PRACTIcE, 250-56 (B. Bittker ed. 1970).
153 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
[Vol. 34
LIABILITIES OF ATTORNEYS
tion of the securities statutes was his issuance of an opinion that an exemp-
tion was available "although he must have known"'54 that the facts of the
situation negated the exemption. This indicates that a good faith belief
in the correctness of an opinion, perhaps coupled with investigation of
facts of which he has inquiry notice, would suffice to remove the attorney
from the antifraud rules, at least in criminal actions. This standard would
accord with other leading authorities on the application of criminal and
regulatory statutes to counsel's advice-giving function.
In 1966, the Ninth Circuit spoke on counsel's liability in a private
antitrust damage action charging attempted monopolization. 5' The court
held in the negative where the only role is that of legal adviser (even if
the legal advice is wrong). "But," said the court, "if he [counsel] goes
beyond that role and, acting by himself or jointly with others, makes policy
decisions for the corporation, then he subjects himself to liability for at-
tempted monopolization as in the case of any executive officer of the com-
pany performing a similar function."'156 The court did not state that the
immunity for legal advice is limited to advice given with good faith belief
in its correctness, although that seems a fair implication of the lawyer-
business policy dichotomy, for one lacking good faith belief in his advice
that a course of conduct is legal is not acting as a lawyer.
One of the leading casebooks on Legal Profession has long carried
People v. Kresel,57 a New York Appellate Divison case holding that a
lawyer giving good faith advice on a doubtful question of law that a course
of action is legal does not become an aider and abettor simply because his
advice is wrong. The lawyer had been convicted after a jury instruction
that the only intent required was that required of a director (intent to do
the prohibited act). In reversing, the majority opinion said:
There is no evidence that appellant urged or incited anyone to commit
any offense. The extent of his offending is that he failed to forbid his
clients to proceed. He swore that he believed the plan to be within the law.
The court of last resort has since held that he was mistaken. When ap-
pellant gave his advice, the question was unsettled. It is worthy of note
that neither the Appellate Division nor the Court of Appeals was unani-
mous in its construction of the law. A lawyer is not to be held criminally
responsible because he honestly gives mistaken advice upon a doubtful ques-
tion of law. No lawyer is answerable if he is mistaken concerning a ques-
tion of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed
lawyers .... In Montriou v. Jefferys, 2 Carr. & P. 113, 116, Lord Chief
Justice Abott said :"No attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid
154Id. at 863.
15 5 Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n v. Tillamook Co. Cream Assn., 358 F.2d 115 (9th Cir.1966).
156Id. at 118.
157 243 App. Div. 137, 277 N.Y.S. 168 (1935), reprinted in part in S. THiuRMAN, E. PHIL-
LIPS, JR. & E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 246 (1970).
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that it should be imagined that an attorney, or a counsel, or even a judge is
bound to know all the law."
Infallibility is an attribute of neither lawyer nor judge. And yet in
this case the trial court said to the jury that appellant was conclusively
presumed to know the law and that the law involved herein was plain and
unambiguous. It is a silly perversion of the legal fiction that every one
is bound to know the law, to insist that, in this field of law, lawyers shall
decide all questions in accordance with what the courts may ultimately
hold, at the peril that the failure to -prophesy correctly the final outcome
will make them criminal accessories.
158
c. The resolution
It would appear doubtful that the courts, in applying the antifraud
rules, would hold an attorney to have violated those rules under a theory
that, while he made a good faith attempt to apply the governing author-
ities to particular facts, his belief that he was correctly doing so was unrea-
sonable. If the attorney's sole error is in synthesis, extrapolation, or pro-
jection, it is next to impossible to find fault with such an error. We have
seen that these errors are usually beyond the realm of malpractice actions,
much less actions under the antifraud rules.
The strong possibilities for application of the present antifraud rules
to erroneous legal opinions rendered in subjective good faith arise, it seems
to me, only when the attorney fails to follow through on factual discrep-
ancies of which he has inquiry notice or when he has not reasonably re-
searched the law. The courts will probably not exclude legal opinions,
which unleash securities upon investors, from the antifraud rules unless the
attorney has followed through on facts of which he has inquiry notice. It
is a waste of the attorney's knowledge of the law to allow him to opine fa-
vorably on the basis that he has no actual knowledge of facts that would
change his opinion. Of all the people involved in a securities transaction,
the attorney is by far the most aware of the significance of facts of which
he has inquiry notice. Indeed, this may be one of the reasons why the
SEC seems to maintain that an attorney should not favorably opine on an
exemption unless he has reasonably investigated the underlying facts.
Likewise, a failure reasonably to research the law before opining could
negate the exemption from the antifraud rules for an erroneous opinion
given in subjective good faith. The imposition of such a duty would be
analogous to requiring a follow through on facts of which the attorney
has inquiry notice. In both cases the lawyer's role is pivotal, he is in the
best position to perform the function, and performance is not unduly bur-
densome. Furthermore, reasonable research of the law is clearly a duty
owed the clients and recipients of opinions under state law. In addition,
there is an increasingly large body of law to be consulted as judicial opin-
158 243 App. Div. at 142, 277 N.Y.S. at 175-76.
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ions become more numerous, more detailed (and explicit) rules are pro-
mulgated, an increased number of SEC releases are issued, and no-action
letters are published. Reasonable investigation will often yield no an-
swer or conflicting answers, but since securities regulation is fast becoming
like tax law in its use of explicit formulae and in the accumulation of judi-
cial and administrative precedents, there are strong arguments that a law-
yer's opinion implicitly represents reasonable research and consideration of
relevant authority found. The time when the law of securities regulation
primarily could involve only seat-of-the-pants judgments is gone. Differ-
ent lawyers will handle the authorities, especially the published no-action
letters, differently; for example, an unsupported SEC position in a published
no-action letter certainly would not preclude a good faith judgment that
the contrary position will ultimately prevail in court. Consultation of
these authorities will, however, cause the lawyer to analyze the problem
'and the risks, which is in the best interests of clients, recipients of opin-
ions, and the public.
4. Use of Paraprofessionals
Use by law firms of their paraprofessionals to work on disclosure docu-
ments becomes especially dangerous if courts impose demanding concepts
of inquiry notice. The paraprofessional will usually have only a minor frac-
tion of the lawyer's ability to spot and evaluate the potential significance
of suspicious circumstances, especially when the circumstances concern
mixed questions of law and fact. If lawyers wish to avoid burdens of
factual investigation, a far safer alternative is greater lawyer programming
of investigations by fairly senior company personnel familiar with the areas
they investigate. The lawyer could establish a written program, insist up-
on memoranda, list, and documentation, and could follow through him-
self only on the apparent trouble spots. In general, I believe BarChris
should demonstrate that securities work is about the last place in a law
firm where paraprofessionals can be utilized.
5. The Antifraud Rules and Suspension or Disbarment of
Attorneys by the SEC
SEC Rules of Practice, Rule 2 (e) 159 authorizes temporary or permanent
denial by the SEC of the right to appear or practice before the agency.
The Rule applies to any person found, inter alia,
to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct or to have
willfully violated .... [or] willfully aided and abetted the violation of
any provision of the Federal Securities laws ... or the rules .. . thereun-
der.160
159 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1972).
160 Id.
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Despite the obvious importance of rule 2(e) to lawyers doirng securities
work, I will not discuss the rule, which is covered in an excellent, recent
Comment in the Duke Law Journal.161
F. Uncertainties Concerning Lawyers' Responses to
Auditors' Requests for Information
Accountants preceded lawyers, by about a decade, as major targets of
antifraud actions under the securities statutes. At present we are witness-
ing hard maneuvering by accountants vis-&-vis underwriters on comfort
letters." 2 Fencing between lawyers and accountants will likely proceed
on several fronts. One of the more active areas concerns broad requests
by auditors about the attorney's knowledge concerning matters such as the
client's liabilities in matters being litigated, contingent liabilities not pres-
ently involving claims or lawsuits, transactions not in the normal course
of business, conditions concerning capital stock which would prevent it
from being fully paid and nonassessable, and any other matters which may
affect the assets, liabilities, or capital of the company. These requests are
usually forwarded by the company to the attorney for his reply.
The proper form of reply raises most of the questions discussed in this
article. The requests cannot be brushed aside or left unanswered, for the
auditor might refuse to certify. On the other hand, the lawyer's response
will obviously affect the certified financials ultimately used in securities
transactions and disclosure documents, and the attorney must be careful
not to misstate or mislead. Yet broad inquiries about possible contingent
liabilities, transactions not in the ordinary course of business, and defects
in capital stock will touch every raw nerve and possible disclosure skeleton
in the corporation's past. I will not pursue the considerations in framing
the reply, for they are discussed in an excellent recent article by Mr. Rich-
ard E. Deer, an Indianapolis attorney. 63
III. THE LAWYER'S DUTY TO REPORT PROSPECTiVE
VIOLATIONS AND TO WITHDRAW FROM REPRESENTATION
The suggestion that a lawyer representing a client which plans to dis-
regard the lawyer's advice that a course of action is illegal must withdraw
from representation and report the client's plan to the proper authorities
is simultaneously the most controversial and the most unimportant of the
developments concerning lawyers' duties under the securities acts. The ques-
161 Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role
and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L. J. 968.
16 2 See AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 48, LETTERS FOR UNDER-
WRITERS (1971).
163 Deer, Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 28 BUs. LAW. 947
(1973). This article, which appears in the April 1973 issue of BUSINESS LAWYER, was circu-
lated in reprint form early in 1973 to BUSINESS LAWYER subscribers.
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tion is relatively unimportant because clients have seldom proceeded in the
face of an attorney's advice that to do so is illegal and because in the future
:the situation will arise even less oftenr. One clear impact of Garner v.
Wolfinbarger6  will be almost total compliance with counsel's injunctions
that a planned course of action is illegal or will create liability, for that
advice is now subject to discovery by shareholders, and a management pro-
ceeding against counsel's advice surely builds a strong case against itself.
The ABA was correct when it argued in Garner v. Wolfinbarger that a
failure to honor the attorney-client privilege in litigation between the cor-
poration and shareholders will diminish candor by counsel in advising the
corporation that certain action will be illegal. When presented with
schemes that he believes are illegal, however, counsel will still be under
strong pressure to be candid, for a hedged opinion allowing management
to proceed can be costly to the corporate entity and a new management or
a trustee in bankruptcy may be quite willing to ask counsel to defray the
entity's losses from the lack of forthrightness. And as we have seen, cor-
porate counsel's duties may now run both to the entity and to shareholders
and prospective shareholders harmed by the lack of candor. Moreover,
lack of a good faith belief in the opinion would place counsel afoul of
the antifraud rules. In short, the pressures for candor are quite as strong
as the counterpressure.
In any event, Opinion 314 of the ABA's Committee on Professional
Ethics, the opinion concerning the ethical duties of tax lawyers to the In-
ternal Revenue Service, dealt with a directly analogous question when it
indicated that disclosure of even the client's confidences would be required
"if facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that
a crime will be committed."' 65 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 (B) (1) of the
new Code seems equally strong in stating that
[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal.166
In the securities area, a client proceeding in the face of counsel's advice
that his conduct is illegal is "clearly establishing" in the attorney's view a
criminal and fraudulent act. If the attorney is bound to blow the whistle
when he discovers a fraud after the fact, he would seemingly be required
to take reasonable steps to prevent its occurrence, notwithstanding the in-junction to preserve client confidences. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C)
164 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
16 5 AmER. BAR Assoc, OPINIoNs ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, 688, 691 (1967).
16 6 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DIsCIPLINARY RULE 7-102 (B) (1).
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states that "a lawyer may reveal the intention of this, client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.' 167 Since pre-
vention of the crime is the paramount aim, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)
should be interpreted, in line with Disciplinary Rule 7-102 (B.) (1), to re-
quire the lawyer first to notify the client of the lawyer's proposed course of
action if he does not abandon the plan. After this step is taken, few clients
would proceed. If the logic of Garner v. Wolfinbarger is followed, cor-
porate counsel will have a positive duty to their other clients, shareholders
and prospective shareholders, that is at least as demanding as the duties
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The attorney's obligations to the corporate entity itself may compel
him to report serious violations or planned violations of the securities laws
by the operating management to the entire board of directors, including par-
ticularly the outside directors. We have earlier discussed A.B.A. Opinion
202,168 issued in 1940, in which an attorney retained by a corporation
learned of questionable activities by its officgrs and was convinced that the
officers would not make a full report to the board of directors. The Com-
mittee said the attorney "may and should" inform the board of directors.
Moses v. Burgin6 9 reinforces this concept, for the court deemed crucial
management's failure to keep outside directors informed.
The subject of the duty to withdraw from representation after the at-
torney has publicly blown the whistle seems doubly academic to me. As
indicated, there will rarely be need publicly to blow the whistle. And
once it is done, I see no legal or ethical reason why counsel could not con-
tinue to represent the corporation if there is a change in management, and
I would assume that if counsel is forced publicly to blow the whistle, the
resulting trauma will force a change in management. If there is no change
in management, I see every practical reason for counsel's orderly withdrawal
from the client's affairs.
In one situation, the Code of Professional Responsibility arguably pro-
duces unappealing results in the securities context. Suppose a corporation
is concerned about a disclosure document used in the past. It consults coun-
sel, who analyzes it and finds it materially defective. The thrust of the
Code is toward rectifying frauds committed by the client while the attor-
ney represents it and toward preventing future crimes (not toward turning
the lawyer into an informer concerning past crimes revealed to him in con-
fidence). Yet, in our hypothetical case, if there is a trading market which
is still being affected by the defective disclosure document, the attorney
167 Id., DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101 (C) (emphasis supplied). The notes to Rule 4-101 (C)
here cite to AMER. BAR Assoc., OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, No. 314 (1965),
which states that an attorney must disclose such confidences.
168 AMER. BAR Assoc, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics 486 (1967), discussed in
text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
169445 F.2d 369 (1st Cit.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
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must advise the corporation that failure to correct the document is a crime
and a fraud-there is a continuing wrong. If the corporation does not is-
sue a public correction, the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
the attorney to request correction, and failing that, to notify the trading
markets (probably through the SEC).
Again, the logic of Garner v. Ifolfinbarger might require the same
result, since there is a continuing series of injuries to trading market pur-
chasers in addition to a consultation about the completed transaction. / It
is not wholly satisfying to see our corporate management be placed under
the gun because of their consultation with counsel about a past transaction,
and the seeming result under the Code will not encourage consultation
and openness in commjications with lawyers.170  On the other hand, the
past act is projecting-'into the future and continues currently to injure in-
vestors. There are strong arguments for treating the continuing fraud or
crime thearme as a wholly prospective one.
/ IV. SCOPE OF THE SEC's RULEMAKING POWERS
TO SPECIFY ATTORNEYS' DuTIEs
The antifraud proscriptions of Securities Act § 17(a) and Exchange
Act rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 create most of the uncertainties concerning at-
torneys' duties, and hence their civil liabilities, under the federal securities
statutes. We have seen that the express liabilities prescribed in §§ 11 and
12 (2) will seldom apply to attorneys, who are seldom "experts, .... issuers,"
or "underwriters" under the former section or "sellers" under the latter
section; and once attorneys come within the scope of these sections, the
fault standard, knowledge or failure reasonably to investigate facts and the
law, is quite clear. There is an interesting uncertainty concerning SEC
powers to require additional legal opinions in registration statements and
hence to bring attorneys into greater contact with § 11. Attorneys resist ef-
forts of securities administrators to require them to supply legal opinions
forming a part of registration statements and prospectuses, but my impres-
sion is that through informal negotiation securities administrators are re-
quiring such opinions on a broader number of issues and that with strong
client and underwriter pressures for effectiveness the efforts are becom-
ing harder to fend off.
But the antifraud provisions are of central importance to attorneys.
Section 11 does not contemplate attorneys' "expertising" of large portions
of the registration statement.17 The antifraud provisions, being applicable
to all persons, whether or not in privity with purchasers and sellers, are
the primary governors of attorneys under the federal securities statutes.
17 0 Mr. Monroe H. Freedman has noted that CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-102 (B) (1) abridges the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
Letter to Editor, 59 A.B.A.J. 114 (1973).
171 See Escort v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1
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We shall also put rule 14a-9 to one side and concentrate upon rule
10b-5 and § 17(a). Whenever a proxy solicitation is made in connection
with an offer or purchase or sale of a security, both rules 10b-5 and 14a-9
apply, although the former seems to encompass everything reached by the
latter. There are proxy solicitations which involve no securities transactions
but which might create major questions about the duty of the attorney un-
der rule 14a-9. But these instances are much less important than the vari-
ety of transactions covered by rule lob-5, and rule 10b-5 is broader in
the principals ("any person") covered by its injunctions than is rule 14a-
9 (persons making solicitations) .172 Moreover, rules under § 10(b) stat-
ing when attorneys will and will not run afoul of rule lob-5 can extend
to rule 14a-9 the safe harbors and defenses provided for rule lob-5.
What then is the extent of the SEC's power concerning rule 10b-5
and § 17(a) ? Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act delegate far-
reaching rulemaking authority to the SEC. Aside from the customary au-
thority to issue rules necessary in the administration of the statutes-a
grant probably carrying with it only the authority to issue what Professor
Davis labels "interpretative" rules' 73-- both statutes authorize the SEC (1)
to define "technical, trade, and accounting terms"' 74; and (2) to classify
persons subject to their jurisdiction and prescribe varying requirements,
though in the Securities Act this authority seems to apply only to the re-
quired contents of registration statements and prospectuses .'7  These dele-
gations authorize what Professor Davis calls "legislative" rules.17& Rule
10b-5, furthermore, implements Section 10(b), which has force only to the
extent SEC rules actually implement it. The Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act also provide an immunity for acts done or omitted in good
faith in conformity with an SEC rule even when the rule is later amended,
rescinded, or declared invalid by a court.'
77
The courts have almost invariably upheld SEC rules. Exemptions from
§ 16(b) of the Exchange Act pursuant to an authority to exempt consistent
with the "purposes" of the section have sometimes been invalidiated or
questioned, but most of the defendants in the actions in which invalida-
172 This means that in order for Rule 14a-9 to reach attorneys, concepts of aiding and abet-
ting and conspiracy would usually be required. On aiding and abetting and conspiracy, see
Ruder, supra note 101.
173 The grants of authority to issue rules necessary in the administration of the statutes are
found in Securities Act § 19(a), Exchange Act § 23(a). On interpretative rules, see 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMIMSTRATIVE LAW §§ 5.03-.05 (1958, Supp. 1965).
174 Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970); Exchange Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(b) (1970).
175 Securities Act §§ 7, 10(a) (4), 10(c), 10(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j(a)4, 77j(c),
77j(d) (1970); Exchange Act § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970).
176 See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 5.03-.04 (1958, Supp. 1965).
177 Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970); Exchange Act § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78w(a) (1970).
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tion occurred qualified for the good faith immunity.178 Testing of any rule
for lack of overall consistency with the judicially perceived purpose of the
statute is an ever present outer limit of the SEC's rulemaking authority, even
when the most explicit broadly phrased legislative rulemaking power is
exercised. 9  In the scheme of the relationship between the SEC and the
judiciary, the judiciary has at least that ultimate role in reviewing the
SEC's rules.
On similar grounds, I argued elsewhere' for the invalidity of rules of
the Comptroller of the Currency, issued in 1963 and rescinded in 1971, that
a violation of his regulations under the Exchange Act (which are applicable
to national banks required to register under § 12 of that Act) would not
create an implied private right of action.' 8 ' A rule, whose sole purpose is to
negate implied private rights otherwise flowing from violations of the stat-
ute and the agency's regulations, attempts to displace a long-standing func-
tion of the judiciary (which historically has created or refused to create
implied private rights of action for violations of the statutes and agency
regulations) and should be considered ultra vires, though perhaps of the
same advisory persuasiveness as an amicus curiae brief.'82
Absent an express delegation of a power to determine which violations
of statutes and rules will create private rights of action, the agency should
be without jurisdiction to reverse the historical practices and order the
courts to imply, or not to imply, a private right of action for violations
of the statute or a rule. The statutes give no hint of an express delega-
tion. For example, the contract-voiding provisions of the statutes, which
are one of the bases of implied private rights, contain no "technical, trade
or accounting terms" to be defined. Furthermore, the immunity, found in
both statutes, for acts done in good faith reliance would not shield a viola-
tor unsuccessfully invoking a negation rule in implied private rights litiga-
tion. If the negation rule were found invalid, good faith reliance upon it
could not be shown. The negation rule would not have assured the de-
fendant it was lawful to commit the act, but rather would have told him
that, although he will be liable for administrative, injunctive and criminal
178 See II L Loss, SECJRITIES REGULATION 1114-17 (1961, Supp. 1969). In Feder v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970), the
court made it plain that exemptions from Exchange Act § 16(b) would continue to receive
close scrutiny in the Second Circuit
179 Cf., e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 41 U.S.LW. 4593 (U.S., May 7, 1973); Estate of
Willett v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1966).
180 Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under
the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of
Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 925 (1966) [hereinafter referred to
as Shipman].
'
81The rules are found in 12 C.F.R. §§ 10.2, 16.11 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 31 Fed.
Reg. 6949-57 (May 12, 1966). Rescission of the negation rules came in the 1971 revision.
See 36 Fed. Reg. 14997-15035 (Aug. 12, 1971).
182 See Shipman, supra note 180, at 925-63.
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penalties if there is a violation of the statute, he will not be liable to pri-
vate persons injured by his violation.'83
It is quite different when the SEC tailors its rules to determine the reach
of the statute for all purposes. The SEC is not attempting to specify the
remedies for violations. It is stating that there will or will not be a viola-
tion, a judgment that the purposes of the statute are best served if the act
is proscribed or put beyond the reach of the statute for all purposes. This
type of rulemaking jurisdiction is one clearly committed to the SEC. 184
Outer limits on the stringency of rules applicable to attorneys flow from
the limitation in § 10(b) of rulemaking authority to proscription of "de-
ceptive or manipulative" devices or contrivances. The on-going debate con-
cerning the degree of fault or scienter required before rule 10b-5 is vio-
lated relates, in part, to doubts about the outer limits of § 10(b).185 It
would, for example, be highly doubtful that the SEC could by rule make
_nlawful an attorney's erroneous opinion if good faith and reasonable
care accompany preparation of the opinion. It is also highly academic
to consider whether such a rule would be valid, for rule 10b-5 (2), which
literally seems to proscribe material misstatements and half-truths without
regard to scienter or fault, was held in Texas Gulf Sulphur not to reach
material misstatements made in good faith and after reasonable care had
-been exercised. 86 The SEC has not indicated any quarrel with that hold-
ing, and indeed everyone seems to assume that a combination of good
faith and reasonable care is certainly a valid defense to actions under
the antifraud rules." 7 Rules governing attorneys' duties would revolve
around the question whether lack of either good faith or reasonable care
should constitute sufficient fault to bring the attorney within the ambit
of rule lob-5. This seems well within the scope of § 10(b).l
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act poses no special problem to the ex-
tent that it does not reach many transactions regulated by rule lob-5-for
example, misstatements or fraudulent acts by a purchaser, which are out-
side the scope of § 17 (a). Section 17 (a) may also be more limited in its
application to persons not in privity with a purchaser affected by a misstate-
ment or a fraud. In any event, when § 17 (a) and rule 10b-5 both apply
to attorneys, parallel rules under § 17(a) and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act
183See Shipman, supra note 180, at 961-63.
184 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 173-78 supra.
185 See, e.g., Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 93,773 (10th Cir. 1973). For a comprehensive discussion of scienter and fault
standards, see Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,816 (2d Cir. 1973).
186 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
187 See Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,682 (D. Del. 1972).
188 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971): "Section
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively."
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could be adopted. The rules under § 17 (a) would seem to be interpreta-
tive, as opposed to the legislative nature of rules under § 10(b). Because
of the recent tendency to equate rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) where they over-
lap' -- a most natural action since rule lob-5 was modeled upon § 17(a)
-rules interpreting § 17(a) on questions such as fault and scienter would
surely be accepted if parallel rules under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act
governing the application of rule 10b-5 were upheld.
Another source of SEC authority concerning the duties of attorneys
arises from the SEC's power to condition exemptions upon an attorney's
undertaking certain responsibilities. So far this has been a little-used
power. The major exemptive rules-Rule 144, Regulation A, and pro-
posed Rule 146-say nothing about the participation of an attorney. It
would, however, be logical to condition some exemptions provided by rule
upon the prior obtaining of an appropriate written opinion of counsel ad-
dressed to affected parties and meeting requirements laid down by the SEC.
This concept has been employed by the California Securities Act, which re-
quires counsel's opinion that the organizational offering exemption is ap-
plicable as a condition to its availability.' 9" The SEC has seldom employed
this technique, although the new rule concerning self-underwritten offer-
ings by SECO broker-dealers is an extreme application: one of the condi-
tions to be met before an SECO broker-dealer can act as a direct distributor
of its securities to the public is that an independent counsel opine that there
is no violation of the federal securities statutes, an opinion which seeming-
ly would require counsel to verify all facts in the prospectus.' 9 '
A variant of this general concept of conditioning favorable treatment
upon the prior obtaining of counsel's written opinion is now employed
in the SEC's no-action letter process, where such an opinion (expressed to
the SEC) is a necessary, though obviously not necessarily sufficient, condi-
tion to issuance of a no-action letter.'92 The concept could be expanded.
As counsel undertakes greater responsibility to his client and investors,
faster processing and less pre-transaction governmental scrutiny are in order.
Attorneys' duties are subject to SEC rulemaking power in another, dose-
ly related way. If the SEC were to establish, by rule, express partial de-
fenses for acts done or omitted in reasonable reliance upon counsel's opin-
.ion, a part of the equation would involve a specification of the types of
opinions supplying the defense and of attorneys' duties under the secu-
rities statutes in giving such opinions.193  This type of framework prevails
189 See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-87 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
190 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h) (5) (West Supp. 1972).
19117 C.F.R. § 240. 15b10-9, adopted in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9883 (Dec. 4,
1972).
192 See 4 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 66,481.10.
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under § 11 on those relatively few items of information with respect to
which counsel is an expert within the meaning of that section, and the de-
fense to which one relying upon counsel's opinion is entitled is always
intertwined with the attorney's duties. As the responsibility undertaken by
the attorney increases, the defenses provided by reliance upon his opinions
should expand.
V. DESIRABILITY OF SEC RULEMAKING
AND THE INDICATED DIRECTIONS
There are substantial arguments that the SEC should do nothing~con-
cerning the developing uncertainties about attorneys' duties. After all,
the courts have generations of experience in dealing with fraud, negligence
and recklessness in privity and non-privity situations. Courts are sophisti-
cated about the ultimate, often conflicting considerations-who are the best
cost avoiders, who are the best loss bearers, fairness, and how thorough-
going a quest for fairness and full and accurate information should the
system undertake in order to thrive and expand.194  Moreover, the securi-
ties statutes leave available to underwriters and other purchasers from the
issuer the possibility of negotiating for more comprehensive opinions than
counsel now give. Indeed, to the extent the underwriter requires tax, pat-
ent, title or similar opinions to be described in the prospectus pursuant to a
consent filed by counsel, the underwriter is obtaining some protection for
itself under § 11 and at the same time obtaining direct protection under the
same section for the public. For sufficient consideration-which would be
borne by the issuing company, the promoters, the selling shareholders, the
underwriters, and the ultimate purchasers in some undetermined propor-
tions--counsel can be induced to expand their opinions. For example, if
legal opinions in underwritings are skeletal on key points, it is because so-
phisticated intermediaries to whom the opinions are addressed-the under-
writers-have accepted them, evidencing a belief that more is not desirable.
This latter argument-leave it to the market-was of course rejected
193 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-1 (a) (2) (vi):
If a foundation manager, after full disdosure of the factual situation to legal
counsel ... relies on the advice of such counsel expressed in a written opinion that an
expenditure is not taxable expenditure .. . [then, even if counsel is wrong] the foun-
dation manager's agreement to such expenditure ... will ordinarily not be considered
"knowing," or willful" and will ordinarily be considered due to reasonable cause ....
A written legal opinion will be considered "reasoned" even if it reaches a conclusion
which is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as such opinion addresses
itself to the facts and applicable law. However, a written legal opinion will not be
considered "reasoned" if it does tsothing more than recite the facts and express a con-
clusion.
194 For provocative theoretical analyses of the ultimate purposes of torts law, see Conard, A
Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability For Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895; G. CALA-
BRESI, THE COST OF AccIDENTs - A LEGAL AND ECONoMic ANALYsIs (1970); Posner,
Book Review, 37 U. CHI. L REV. 636 (1970); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. IEGAL
STUD. 29 (1972); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L J. 1055 (1972).
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when Congress enacted the securities statutes. Contract provisions could
theoretically approximate § 11 allocations of the risks of inaccurate infor-
mation, and in any privity situation, the purchaser can always, at least the-
oretically, attempt to exact warranties going at least as far as the antifraud
rules. What Congress perceived, however, in the 30's was that the direct
and indirect bargaining power of the public to obtain adequate information
had been insufficient,- severely aggravating an all-important public distrust
of corporate securities.'95 Nonwaivable norms of disclosure were deemed
a necessary foundation for public confidence (and hence a lower cost of
capital) .196
Congress also shrewdly perceived in § 11 that persons other than the
issuer might be the best preventers of defective disclosure. For this reason,
underwriters, "experts," directors, the top operating and financial officers,
and the certifying accountants were held to duties of reasonable investi-
gation. The antifraud sections, by eschewing a limitation to the persons
actually buying or selling securities, demonstrate the same general thrust.
It is this statutory structure of nonwaivable norms of disclosure and of cov-
erage of everyone having significant contracts with the marketing of secur-
ities which the SEC must cause to work. The SEC is, moreover, subject
to a practical charge, perhaps to an unrealistically large degree, to main-
tain public confidence in the markets. 197  The SEC's discretion to move
toward a model leaving information production and verification primarily
to market forces is thus limited by law and political forces. This is espe-
cially so when one considers that the free alienability of most corporate
securities causes information deficiencies that at first concernthe issuer and
the purchaser ultimately to come to rest upon and play havoc with the
trading markets, where contractual negotiation with the issuer for informa-
tion is next to impossible.
The choice on rulemaking versus reliance upon judicial development is
not dependent upon whether rulemaking might be so extensive as to leave
little role for the courts in the development of the law. Since the focus
upon the uncertainties facing attorneys is so recent, I cannot imagine anyone
so bold or foolhardy as to suggest that rulemaking can answer all ques-
tions. Furthermore, thirty years experience with lengthy, prolix internal
revenue acts and regulations interpreting them suggest that the judiciary is
in no danger of being reduced to a mere fact-finder even under the most
19 5 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48, 851-52, 858-62 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
196 Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act void waivers of compliance. Securities Act
§ 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970); Exchange Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970).
197In SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973) (adoption of exchange insti-
tuitional membership rule), the SEC boldly asserted authority and responsibility concerning the
securities markets and the securities traded there. For reservations about the SEC's proper role
in promoting positive attitudes, see Cary, Foreword to S. ROBBINs, THm SncmrTrs MARKETS
vii-lx (1966).
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heroic attempts at comprehensiveness in statutes and regulations. We have
had sufficient experience with rulemaking to indicate, however, that rule-
making can be helpful when there is agreement only on maxima and mini-
ma and the desired results in frequently recurring situations, although the
agency may be unwilling or unable to attempt to formulate the principles
in fully developed form.198
In this article, I have attempted to describe perhaps half a dozen fre-
quently recurring situations to which-there should be fairly definite answers
and to which such answers can be supplied by regulations with numerous
examples.199 Any such rulemaking effort would necessarily be incomplete
and would require supplementation by judicial and SEC decisions apply-
ing the general antifraud rules. The regulations themselves would, how-
ever, be proper precedent for analogical reasoning in much the same man-
ner that statutory resolutions in other jurisdictions can be proper precedent
for a court making a common law determination.200
A. Advantages
Rulemaking has two central advantages. One is that the dearest pos-
sible standards are needed concerning the duties imposed upon attorneys
by the antifraud rules to notify investors or the SEC of disclosure defi-
ciencies of the corporate client. American lawyers properly take quite ser-
iously the duties of loyalty to the client and preservation of its confidences,
and attorneys will need the most explicit possible legal standards to guide
them as we enter what appears to be an era of expanding notions of share-
holders and potential shareholders as common clients with the corporation.
In general these notions are logical and beneficial in the context of compli-
ance with the securities statutes, but they run counter to corporate coun-
sel's intuition and training. Corporate counsel, moreover, owes his posi-
tion to management, and in a society as aggressive and success-oriented as
ours, only the most unambiguous legal standards will cause corporate coun-
sel to fully recognize the emerging legally required increase in the division
of loyalties of corporate counsel between the corporate entity and investors
in it. Most importantly, management itself is entitled to know the extent
of the attorney's division of loyalties.
Another reason for rules governing the duties of attorneys flows out
of the fact that compliance with the securities statutes is a team effort by
company personnel, accountants, underwriters and lawyers. In the absence
of rules concerning the role of lawyers, the current scare about the attor-
ney's possible liabilities may lead him either to attempt to avoid responsi-
198See K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JuSTICE 59-64 (1969).
199 Treasury Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code effectively employ numerous
examples. The SEC's rules usually shun examples.
200 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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bilities for which he is best fitted or to perform needless duplication of
investigation performed by others. In securities work, there has been little
systematic analysis attempting to determine the optimal use of the attorney
in producing compliance. A rulemaking proceeding that would as a first
order of business gather information and give hard study to the costs of
lawyer involvement and to the areas in which his involvement is crucial
would seem a prerequisite to a system making the best use of the lawyer's
time and talents.
A proceeding looking toward prospective rules would not limit the
SEC if it found cases which should be tried in injunctive or similar actions
under the present form of rule lob-5. When the SEC considers an appli-
cation of rule 10b-5 in a disputed area outside the results in prior litigated
cases, there is some propensity to treat litigation and rulemaking as mutual-
ly exclusive-which ignores the prospective nature of rulemaking. Since
the SEC's rules have invariably been prospective, a rulemaking proceeding
and new rules would not interfere with the proper trial of pending cases.
At the same time, the adoption of prospective rules defining what rule 10b-
5 requires of attorneys need not undermine the SEC's position on the reach
of rule 10b-5 at present. The new rules could be accompanied by a
declaration that no inference is to be drawn from the action concerning the
reach of present law, which would govern alleged violations occurring be-
fore the new rules.
Interpretation of statutes and rules has progressed to the point that
prospective modification of a standard is no longer taken as an indication
by the legislature of the reach of standard before its modification, especial-
ly when the legislature disclaims any such implied interpretation.201
When the SEC spots an emerging problem, litigation may be the appropri-
ate first response. A dramatic case captures attention and focuses it upon
the problem, often the necessary initial step. The litigation should not,
however, obscure the facts that rulemaking may be the long-range solution
and that the prospective rulemaking proceeding need not interfere with
the litigation or assertion of the SEC's position under prior law.
B. Alternatives
If there is to be a code governing attorneys' duties in securities work,
why shouldn't the code be a part of the ABA's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility? The AICPA has, for example, taken quite seriously the view
in BarChris that the standards of the profession set accountants' duties of
reasonable investigation under § 11 and has issued a number of state-
ments, including one on comfort letters, designed to set standards for ac-
countants in securities work.20 2 The SEC has commissioned the NASD to
201 On the administrative front, see SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969).
202 See text accompanying notes 100-104, 162 supra. In Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283
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set standards of reasonable investigation by underwriters in public offer-
ings.203 A prominent securities lawyer who was formerly Associate Gen-
eral Counsel of the SEC and a member of that body has- asked the Presi-
dent of the ABA to appoint a special committee to work with the SEC to
set guidelines protecting lawyers. °4
I prefer SEC rules governing attorneys' duties in securities work for two
closely related reasons. First, only SEC rules can provide needed protec-
tions for lawyers when those protections are needed. Garner v. Wolfin-
barger demonstrated that ABA pronouncements, even one so formal and
carefully considered as the Code of Professional Responsibility, are prop-
erly to be considered advisory when, as is often true, the litigation before
the court presents major issues affecting the public." 5 Secondly, the SEC
is, of course, far better structured to be forced to consider the interests of
investors-and indeed of issuers, company personnel, underwriters, and ac-
countants-as they are affected by a code of conduct for lawyers in secur-
ities transactions.
Congress also seems a less appropriate forum than the SEC for resolu-
tion of these issues, at least initially. The best answers are likely to emerge
only after immersion into the nitty-gritty of securities transactions. And an
ability rather quickly to change standards that prove unduly burdensome
or ineffective seems essential. After all, thought has been devoted to these
questions only since the BarChris decision in 1968 stirred the interest of
the bar in attorneys' duties and vulnerability. Moreover, the SEC in the
past two years has shown an increased zest for tackling the toughest prob-
lems by rules. 06 Lastly, the SEC is close enough to the bar to understand
attorneys' strengths and yet sufficiently underwhelmed to evaluate and cor-
rect the weaknesses of current practices.
C. Indicated Directions for Rulemaking
As I indicated at the beginning of this article, I have not attempted to
formulate an outline or a draft of the ultimate rules that might be adopted.
It would be presumptuous for me to do so, because a hard, detailed, prag-
matic examination of the attorney's interaction with other participants in a
variety of securities transactions is a precondition to optimal rules govern-
F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), judge McLean stated that "[a]ccountants should not be
held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession."
203 SEC Exchange Act Release Nos. 9670-71 (July 26, 1972).
20 4 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No 182, A-2 (Dec. 20, 1972).
205 The preliminary statement in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility declares that the Code does not "undertake to define standards for civil liability of
lawyers for professional conduct."
206 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan.
11, 1972); 17 C.F.R. § 230.145, adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6,
1972); Proposed Securities Act Rule 146, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28,
1972); Proposed Securities Act Rule 147, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973).
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ing attorneys' duties. It is appropriate, however, for me to indicate some
considerations that might be kept in mind as such rules are drafted.
The SEC should specify when counsel is expected to notify affected in-
vestors or the SEC of a client's disclosure deficiencies. Though largely
academic, of all the questions discussed in this article, this question most
excites the bar. A focus upon specifics can convert the heat into light, and
well-defined rules will in a sense moot the question, as counsel will not
need to take the ultimate step if everyone is aware when counsel must re-
quest the client to disclose an error or to abandon a planned violation and
must notify investors or the SEC if the client does not comply.
A major consideration in fashioning rules is that direct purchasers may
contract for greater counsel responsibilities. This should carry considerable
weight in defining the nonwaivable duties which the antifraud rules place
upon attorneys. Underwriters, broker-dealers, and institutional investors
have the savvy and the financial self-interest to appreciate the increased
protections that stronger legal opinions provide. They also have consider-
able ability to shift the costs back to the issuer or selling shareholder or
forward to purchasers. The best practices of these securities sophisticates
are thus highly relevant.
Many current uncertainties concern the allocation of functions among
company personnel, counsel, accountants, and underwriters, and I don't
see a consensus emerging among those groups, each running scared of lia-
bilities. The sparring between accountants and underwriters over comfort
letters appears not to have ended with the issuance in 1971 of the AICPA's
cautious Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 48, Letters for Under-
writers 07  Counsel and accountants cannot each be expected to grab the
responsibility for the no-man's land of material figures that seem not to fit
in the certified financials because they are not based upon historical costs.208
In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,20° the directors held negli-
gent in reviewing the defective proxy statement unsuccessfully argued rea-
sonable reliance upon counsel, and in general, we can anticipate more than
a few post hoc jurisdictional disclaimer disputes between company person-
nel and counsel.
The SEC's foremost responsibility is to ensure that gaps do not develop
because of a failure expressly to allocate responsibility in advance and that
fear of liability does not create unnecessary duplication. Disclosure docu-
ments should be required to specify who has checked what and the respon-
sibility undertaken by each participant, thus encouraging a definite alloca-
tion of responsibilities before work on the disclosure document begins.
Investors should know how the information was put together and the ex-
2 0 7 See text accompanying note 162 supra.
2 0 8 See text accompanying notes 5 7-60 supra.
209 CCH FED. SEc L Rm,. 5 93,682 (D. Del. 1972).
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tent to which counsel stands behind it. Disclosure of agreed-upon alloca-
tions of effort should be supplemented by specified minimum standards
for each participant. This involves an analysis of comparative advantages.
For example, issuer's counsel should not be required to conduct a "reason-
able investigation" of all facts in a registration statement even if the SEC
had the authority to require this (which it does not), for much factual in-
vestigation is performed as well or better with less expense by others. On
the other hand, counsel is best equipped to devise a plan detailing efforts
by him and by others that should, if properly executed, add up to a reason-
able investigation; and disclosure of existence and compliance with such
a plan would seem appropriate.
A concept of attorneys' work papers and work programs should be in-
stituted by SEC rules. This may not be received well by the bar, but it is a
necessity. Attorneys already resent the extent to which their duties and
work procedures are coming to resemble those of accountants, but specified
systematic procedures as a starting point (always to be supplemented when
required or modified when the procedures make no sense) are useful in a
complicated transaction, especially one demanding high disclosure stan-
dards concerning all material facts.
SEC rules requiring counsel to follow through, in any disclosure mat-
ter, if he has inquiry notice would use well the considerable knowledge
of counsel and would clearly be authorized by § 10(b). Likewise, re-
quiring that counsel's favorable opinion on an exemption issue only if he
has proceeded in good faith and with reasonable care to research the law
and the factual base would use to good advantage the attorney's superior
ability to locate and evaluate the law and facts central to the exemption
issue and would be within § 10(b). Terms such as "reasonable investiga-
tion" can and should be defined to exclude efforts with a small probable
informational return and to allow considerable reliance upon clients. In
general, the most meaningful SEC rules will be those specifying what con-
stitutes a reasonable investigation for participants in securities transactions.
Perhaps the most difficult consideration for the SEC, and the courts, to
deal with precisely is Judge Cardozo's concern in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche 1° echoed by Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in Texas Gulf
Sulphur,21' about indeterminate liabilities to indeterminate classes. Law
firms themselves are less capable loss bearers than thousands of atomized
investors. On the other hand, the purpose of civil liabilities under the
federal securities statutes is more heavily weighted toward maintenance
of high standards of disclosure rather than toward full compensation for
losses.212 Attorneys are as central to the disclosure process as accountants,
210225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
211 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864-69 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
212 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9671 at 6-7 (July 16, 1972).'
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underwriters and company personnel and they cannot hope to lag far be-
hind them in duties to investors and liability exposure.
Attorneys are now much closer to those groups in liability exposure
than the bar realizes. An issuer's counsel falsely opining to underwrit-
ers that he knows of no material misstatement or half-truth in a prospectus
would surely be liable in damages to all public purchasers218 from the un-
derwriter (not to mention the underwriter)214 and liability-may flow if is-
suer's counsel had simply been on inquiry notice of the misstatement or
half-truth. And in any event many serious disclosure deficiencies to which
counsel is dose will raise triable issues of lack of good faith belief which,
if resolved adversely, will create liability. In a large offering or merger,
liability in the millions is possible.
The SEC can profitably take a close look at liability policies available to
law firms, and a major objective in fashioning rules should be to attempt
to limit exposure so as to ensure that such coverage is generally available
for securities lawyers. Such coverage is a necessity for those who desire
intertemporal spreading of major risks as much as the next person and
who are forbidden by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the fed-
eral securities statutes from shifting, by contract, liabilities to their clients
and from exculpation. Moreover, liability coverage for conduct falling
short of willful wrongs seems to be encouraged by our torts system,215 has
not been discouraged by the SEC in similar contexts, 16 and provides a po-
tential source of recovery by investors. The SEC should keep this and
other aspects of civil liabilities on the scales as it refines its antifraud rules
to provide a code of conduct for securities lawyers. One of the advantages
of a code provided by SEC rules is that those rules can provide appropriate
truly safe harbors to keep liabilities in bounds.
Also desirable is a sharp consciousness of the effect of civil liabilities
in general and of a code of conduct for securities lawyers in particular on
the securities offerings of small issuers. Underwriters, lawyers and accoun-
tants appreciate the inverse, almost geometric relationship between the size
of the issuer and exposure to some liability. The small issuer usually is is-
suing a security carrying greater risk; investors become interested in law-
suits when a security falls in value, not when it prospers, and a larger per-
218 Cf. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).214 See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra.
215 Financial responsibility laws concerning motorists are a good example of encouragement
of insurance. For conduct falling short of a willful wrong, there appears to be no general public
policy against insurance coverage. See R. KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE LAw §§ 5.3(e)-(f)
(1971).
For stimulating thoughts on directors' liability and insurance and indemnification arrange-
ments covering them, see Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence,
1972 DUtKEI J. 895.
216See SEC, Guide to Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Item 46(c), 1
CCH Fri>. SEc. L. REP. 5 3806.
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centage of small issuers' securities will decline in value. It is, moreover,
much easier to make a material misstatement or omission in describing a
small issuer; with a large enough company a slip concerning a $1,000,000
item will not be material. In addition, the small issuer will lack the in-
ternal controls of a larger company and often has no certified financials.
Lastly, in a large offering, legal and accounting fees are a smaller percent-
age of the offering price and hence legal requirements of greater care will
meet less resistance; for the small issuer, blue s4q laws can provide a legal
maximum. 1 7 While the large offering carries some exposure to large lia-
bility, a small issuer's offering is perhaps a higher risk operation. In de-
vising rules governing attorneys' duties, it would be most unfortunate to
set standards that will work well for the attorney advising the NYSE com-
pany but which are impractical for the counsel advising the local manu-
facturer making a Regulation A offering. The small company usually must
have the best affordable counsel to have a fair chance of survival. SEC
rules making it dangerous to represent the small issuer would be a regres-
sion. Investors must be told of the inherent high risk in small issuers'
securities and suitability concepts can be employed, but the flow of re-
sponsible professional help for the small issuer must not be stifled.
An SEC codification of attorneys' duties might also provide express
partial defenses for persons reasonably relying upon specified types of at-
torneys' written opinions. Suppose, for example, that an issuer asks a
broker-dealer to privately place some of its debt securities. There are no
violations of the antifraud rules, and the broker-dealer's securities counsel
advises it, keeps on top of the facts, reasonably researches the law, and in
good faith issues a written opinion that the private offering exemption is
available. The broker-dealer reasonably relies upon the opinion. Later,
a court, in a private action by one of the purchasers under § 12(1), dis-
agrees on the law and holds the exemption unavailable. The broker-dealer
was not negligent in its determination of the law: reasonable reliance on
advice of counsel is one way of showing due care. 218
The reliance is probably no defense in the § 12(1) action, for fault or
scienter (other than a proof of no fault due to good faith reliance on SEC
rule) plays no part in those actions; and indeed due care in predicting
the reach of the federal securities statutes would seem no defense to a de-
termination of whether any of the sections have been violated."" It would
go well beyond stare decisis to allow due or good faith belief on the state
of the law to be a complete defense, and the closest the securities statutes
217 For provocative thoughts and interesting data on blue sky laws, see J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY
RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BusiNEss PROMOTIONS (1971).
218 See Comment, Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 70 YALE L. J. 978, 979 (1961).
2 19 A defendant presenting that defense may strengthen the possibility of a prospective over-
ruling, if the precedent relied upon was settled. Concerning prospective overruling in tort cases,
see R. K ETON, VENTURING To Do JUSlIaC (1969).
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come to that is good faith action in reliance upon an SEC rule. In an in-
teresting recent Truth-In-Lending case, a section of that statute which
could have been literally interpreted to immunize acts pursuant to a good
-faith erroneous interpretation of the law was quickly construed by the court
to protect only good faith clerical errors."'
In civil damage actions against police officers who have unlawfully ar-
rested or searched, the officers do have a defense if they can show both
good faith and reasonable belief in the legal validity of the arrest or
search. 22 - Arguably the broker-dealer is in much the same posi,tion as po-
lice officers and should be allowed to show its reasonable care in determin-
ing the law as a defense even to the private action under § 12(1). The
answer, of course, is that such a delegation of power to lawyers is usually
alien to our conception that the lawyer's interpretation, no matter how rea-
sonable and well considered, cannot freeze the law and its growth and
adaptive processes. The importance of encouraging law enforcement of-
ficials to act upon a reasonable belief is more manifest than encouraging a
broker-dealer with a similar belief. Furthermore, at least in unlawful
searches and seizures, the injured person can be only partially bound
through the law enforcement officer's reasonable belief. The reasonable
belief may relieve the officer from civil liability but the courts in the trial
of the accused may expand what was previously thought to be the suspect's
legal protections, hold the search to be illegal, and refuse to admit its
fruits. Allowing the broker-dealer no defense to the § 12(1) action be-
cause of his reasonable reliance upofi counsel thus appears proper.
Should the broker-dealer nevertheless have a complete defense against
governmental actions brought after the fact? As a practical matter, such
governmental actions would seldom be brought in the situation I have de-
scribed. But suppose such an action were brought. A criminal convic-
tion requires proof of a "willful" violation.~2 The law seems surprisingly
unsettled concerning reliance upon counsel as a defense in a criminal ac-
2 2 0 Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 278-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); but cf. United States v. Von de Carr, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder) CCH FEI). SEC 1.
REp. g 93,481 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
221 On remand, the Second Circut held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), that this standard was applicable
to a claim grounded on the fourth amendment; the Supreme Court, mentioning rights under
the federal securities statutes, had held that an implied private right of action can be based di-
rectly upon violation of the fourth amendment and had remanded for a determination of the
immunity or defense to be available. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Second Circuit decided that because consti-
tutional search and seizure law is so dynamic, the interests of society, law enforcement officials,
and suspects are best balanced if the law enforcement officials are allowed a defense upon show-
ing both a subjective good faith belief and an objective reasonable belief that their conduct was
lawful.
22-2 Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1970); Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a)
(1970).
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tion under the federal securities statutes.2 23  A condition of disciplinary ac-
tion in a broker-dealer proceeding is a finding of "willful" violation, but
"willful" in that setting seems to mean only that the person was awake;
some SEC opinions indicate that reasonable reliance upon counsel would
not show lack of willfulness.22 4 In an after-the-fact proceeding seeking to
enjoin future violations, the reliance upon counsel's opinion would weigh
heavily in the court's determination whether there is sufficient equity for
the injunction.225 In an injunctive action brought during the offering and
seeking its termination, reliance upon counsel's opinion is seemingly im-
material because the issue is whether a violation continues.
In situations such as I have just described, a no-action letter issued upon
an accurate and full disclosure of material facts by the client provides prac-
tical assurance that the SEC will not bring or recommend governmental
action against the client. That concept could be expanded by providing
that certain types of attorneys' written opinions will provide at least some
assurance in the same direction. For example, our hypothetical broker-
dealer who reasonably acted upon counsel's carefully considered written
opinion, should, I think, have express assurance by SEC rules that no
broker-dealer proceeding will be instituted against him and that no crim-
inal proceeding will be recommended .22  Equity actions raise different con-
siderations. The SEC's right to bring an injunctive action before or during
the course of a violation should not be diminished by counsel's opinion
and an after-the-fact equity action can often lead to useful receiverships or
restitutionary payments of the type required in Texas Gulf Sulphur.227
In fashioning rules concerning reliance upon counsel's opinion, should
the laconic, clean opinion be preferred over the opinion expressing in one
form or another the unsettled state of the law. and an estimate of the
probable outcome if the matter were litigated and concluding perhaps only
that success would be more likely than not? The attorney might prefer the
latter form and the client might find it useful in deciding whether and
how to proceed where the law is unsettled. Equal treatment of the two
forms would tacitly encourage transactions to proceed when the attorney
expressly indicates that he will opine only, for example, that it is more likely
than not that the courts would hold an exemption is satisfied.
In fact, most persons probably now so interpret all securities opinions
223 Mathews,, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes:
The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 951-53
(1971).
224 Cf. Handly Investment Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7438 (Oct. 9, 1964); see
Cornelis de Vroldt, 38 S.E.C. 176, 180 (1958); Wolfson & Guttman, The Net Capital Rules
for Brokers and Dealers, 24 STAN. L. REv. 603, 607 (1972).
225SEC v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
226 Cf. note 193 supra and accompanying text.
227 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971).
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in an unsettled area, and a candid, explicit estimate of uncertainty (and
hence the certainty) should not be discouraged."" Furthermore, persons
acting in good faith reliance on such an opinion prepared with due care
should not be considered "willful" violators if a violation is found. The
Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. 229 continues the doctrine that the securities statutes are
to "be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." 2s°  Remedial con-
struction of the securities statutes has created uncertainty as well as an ef-
fective set of investor protections. To hold that one proceeding in the face
of a known substantial uncertainty in the statutes and the SEC's rules com-
mits a willful violation if it is later decided that his lawyer did not draw
the line at the right place would make the remedially construed statutes
unworkable.28
VI. CONCLUSION
In his famous speech delivered in 1934 at the dedication of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Quadrangle, Justice Stone spoke of the Bar's role
in the massive management deviations during the 20's and early 30's from
the fiduciary principle:
There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must bear
some burden of responsibility for these evils. But when we know and face
the facts we shall have to acknowledge that such departures from the fidu-
ciary principle do not usually occur without the active assistance of some
member of our profession, and that their increasing recurrence would have
been impossible but for the complaisance of the Bar, too absorbed in the
workaday care of private interests to take account of these events of pro-
found import or to sound the warning that the profession looks askance
upon these, as things that "are not done."
We must remember, nevertheless, that the very conditions which have
caused specialization, which have drawn so heavily upon the technical
proficiency of the Bar, have likewise placed it in a position where the pos-
sibilities of its influence are almost beyond calculation. The intricacies of
business organization are built upon a legal framework which the current
growth of administrative law is still further elaborating. Without the con-
stant advice and guidance of lawyers business would come to an abrupt
halt. And whatever standards of conduct in the performance of its func-
tion the Bar consciously adopts must at once be reflected in the character of
the world of business and finance. Given a measure of self-conscious and
cohesive professional unity, the Bar may exert a power more beneficient and
far reaching than it or any other non-governmental group has wielded in
the past.232
228 Cf. note 193 supra and accompanying text.
229 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
280 Id. at 12.
231 Cf. note 193 supra and accompanying text.
232 Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1934).
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In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,2 83 easily the most important single devel-
opment discussed in this article, the court did not refer to Justice Stone's
speech, but the same concern for the impact of management derelictions
upon the public and the importance of the best use of attorneys' advice and
influence to guide toward compliance with society's norms (especially legal
ones) was manifest. Many of the current uncertainties facing lawyers arise
because the courts and the SEC are acting upon Justice Stone's observations.
The lawyer's role in securities regulation is so central that his actions
cannot and will not be left to lawyers alone to regulate. What lawyers do
or fail to do will in large measure determine the level of compliance with
the securities statutes. These truisms will not, however, answer the hard
questions discussed in this article. Lawyers do represent clients, not society
at large, and the interests of the two sometimes conflict. But who are the
clients when counsel represents an entity? When, despite additional costs,
do we want to force the 2,ttorney to verify the client's version of the facts
before he issues an opinion that may unleash upon investors securities with
an infirm disclosure base? How should the attorney and his clients pro-
ceed in the face of unsettled legal questions, which seem to abound in
the remedially construed securities statutes? An SEC rulemaking proceed-
ing is a preeminent forum for resolution of these highly practical questions,
'which now present themselves in lawsuits rather than speeches.
233 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
